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The Supreme Court has firmly established that workers covered
by collective bargaining agreements can enforce individual employee rights arising from such contracts by suing their employers
under section 801 of the Labor Management Relations Act.' At
the same time, however, the employee who brings a section 301
action must comply with a series of court-imposed prerequisites
before the merits of his contract claim will be heard. To encourage
private settlement of contract disputes, the Supreme Court has
decreed that an employee who wishes to sue under section 301 must
first exhaust the grievance procedures provided in the collective
bargaining agreement 2 unless he can demonstrate that his union's
refusal to pursue his grievance constitutes a breach of its duty of
fair representation.3 More recently, the lower federal courts have
imposed yet another, peculiarly ill-suited prerequisite: exhaustion
of intra-union appeals.
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1
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1962).
Section
301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
Although the specific subsection which is the subject of this Article is § 301(a),
we will, for simplicity's sake, follow the common practice of referring to it as
§ 301. See Feller, A General Theonj of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAIaw. L. REv. 663, 686-87 n.122 (1973).

2 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
3

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
(989)
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Consider the case of Charles Aldridge, an experienced tool-anddie inspector for Ludwig-Honold Manufacturing Company. 4 Following a layoff of questionable propriety, Aldridge was rehired at a
grade and salary level lower than the one he was entitled to under
the collective bargaining agreement. Just before recommencing
work, he lodged a formal complaint with the union official responsible for filing and processing grievances; however, no grievance was
filed. When Aldridge subsequently discovered the union's omission,
he filed his own grievance though the five-day contract statute of
limitations on filing grievances had run. The company rejected this
grievance as untimely, and the union declined to process it to arbitration because it was likely to be rejected on grounds of timeliness.
Aldridge then sued Ludwig-Honold in a federal district court for
breach of contract and joined his union as party-defendant, alleging
that the latter breached its duty of fair representation when handling
his grievance. Although the court was troubled by the apparent
contract violation and questioned the union's judgment in refusing
to process fully Aldridge's grievance, it granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment because Aldridge had failed to appeal "his union representative's decision not to assert his grievance
within the union itself." 5 In theory, the court had done no more
than to withhold its jurisdiction temporarily; in fact, this form of
judicial abstention will often frustrate pursuit of contract claims
and effectively insulate both employer and union from liability.
Charles Aldridge's predicament is by no means unusual. In
recent years, the notion that a section 301 plaintiff must, before
filing suit, exhaust not only his contract grievance procedures but
also all internal union appeals, has matured into legal dogma.
Indeed, it is now rare that a section 301 plaintiff does not encounter
this defense at the threshold of his action.6 In the Aldridge case,
for example, the district court confidently assumed that the intraunion exhaustion principle was beyond question. Without analyzing the consequences or purposes of requiring intra-union exhaustion in the case before it, the court simply noted that because the
union constitution contained an appeals procedure for challenging
union decisions, Aldridge was obligated to exhaust that procedure
before initiating a section 301 suit.J The court was satisfied to repeat the formulas of prior decisions.
4Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 517 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
6 Id. 698.
6 See, e.g., Klein, Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: Alternative
Forums, in ThE DuTY or FAro REPRESENTATION 99 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
7 385 F. Supp. at 698.
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It should be noted at the outset that, although the Supreme
Court has made exhaustion of contract-grievance procedures a prerequisite to section 301 actions by individual employees, it has never
hinted, even in dictum, that employees should also be required to
exhaust intra-union appeals.8 Rather, the intra-union exhaustion
prerequisite has been developed by lower courts almost entirely
through a process of accretion. Some of the "grandfather" cases
cited with regularity in support of the requirement contain no discussion or justification at all; 9 others invoke statutory and judicial
policies borrowed from other labor statutes and the law of private
associations.'
In a number of section 301 cases, for example, courts have
concluded that the exhaustion doctrine will stimulate the development of union autonomy and union democracy by encouraging the
use of an internal appeals process to resolve internal disputes between the union and its members." In this vein, many courts have
cited liberally the exhaustion proviso in title I of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)' 2 as authority for mandating intra-union exhaustion under section 301.'3
8

Reliance has, however, been placed upon several Supreme Court decisions by
courts invoking the intra-union exhaustion doctrine in § 301 cases. See, e.g., Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), cited in McGovern v. Teamsters Local 773, 447
F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978), and Pullen v. General
Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.
R. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969), cited in Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852,
855 (6th Cir. 1978), and Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 565 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
9 E.g., Day v. UAW Local 36, 466 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1972); Bsharah v. Eltra
Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
10 E.g., cases cited in notes 82 & 83 infra. See also Simpson & Berwick,
Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 TEx. L. BEv.
1179, 1216-19 (1973), for a good discussion of the historical roots of the exhaustion
doctrine.
"1E.g., Foy v. Norfolk & W. By., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 848 (1967); Fabian v. Freight Drivers Local 557, 448 F. Supp. 835, 839
(D. Md. 1978); Ratliff v. Ford Motor Co., 98 L.R.R.M. 2699, 2701 (E.D. Mich.
1978); Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D. Del. 1973).
12LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (1976). See text accompanying notes 96-130 infra for criticism of any reliance upon the exhaustion proviso of
title I in § 301 suits.
1S E.g., Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1978);
Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Thompson v. New York Central R. Co., 250 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(under Railway Labor Act). Like Thompson, many cases involve claims under
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976), rather than under § 301.
E.g., Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722
(8th Cir. 1965). The general convergence of the Railway Labor Act and § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act has been detailed elsewhere; see Feller, supra
note 1, at 676-718. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that courts have
advanced similar rationales in imposing intra-union exhaustion requirements under
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A number of courts have also relied upon provisions in union
constitutions that purport to bind members to exhaust internal
union appeals before resorting to outside tribunals to obtain relief. 14
These rationales, however, assume that section 301 controversies are
internal union matters and overlook the fact that many employees
are not union members.
Intra-union exhaustion is also said to promote the speedy resolution of employee grievances, to aid the conservation of judicial
resources, 15 and to vindicate the federal policy favoring the resolution of labor controversies through private dispute-settlement
mechanisms. 16 In the words of one influential court, the intraunion exhaustion requirement "is bottomed on the hope that
[union] procedures will quickly resolve disputes without the delay
inherent in the judicial process and with the aid of persons experienced at resolving member-union conflicts short of a full-blown
judicial proceeding." 1 These arguments assume again that section
301 disputes arise out of the member-union relationship; they also
assume that union tribunals are expert in resolving such disputes
and have the means to provide a remedy to the employee's grievance.
Standing alone, the objectives cited in support of intra-union
exhaustion are unimpeachable. The question is not, however,
whether they are worthy objectives, but rather whether application
of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine in fact promotes them. This
is an empirical question, rather than one of judicial policy. This
Article analyzes the justifications offered in support of the intraunion exhaustion requirement and explores the many and complex
empirical considerations that have been overlooked. A full appreciation of the facts and the law leads to the inescapable conclusion
that judicial imposition of an intra-union exhaustion requirement
on section 301 plaintiffs is ill-conceived and, in most cases, totally
unsupportable. In part I, we will evaluate the arguments offered
by the courts in support of their extension of the intra-union exthe two statutes and have cited Railway Labor Act cases in actions under § 301.
See, e.g., Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bbd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375, 384, 387
(D.C. Cir. 1978), citing Neal and Brady. Involvement of claims under the
Railway Labor Act will be noted parenthetically.
14 E.g., Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 1974);
Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965) (under
Railway Labor Act); Manica v. Chrysler Corp., 97 L.R.R.M. 2679, 2681 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
15 E.g., Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87,
104 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) (under Railway Labor Act).
16E.g., Orphan v. Fumco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972);
Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
17 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975).
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haustion doctrine to section 301 litigation, concluding that the
exhaustion requirement fails in fact to serve the alleged interests of
employees, courts, unions, or employers. Part II will address a rare
instance in which application of the intra-union exhaustion requirement to section 301 litigation might still be justified, and will then
offer a brief procedural framework for such limited application.
In the final part, we will explore the difficulties which would continue to plague courts that require exhaustion even in the narrow
circumstances described in part II, difficulties which argue, therefore, for total abandonment of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine
in the section 301 setting.
I.

THE GENERAL IMPROPRIETY OF APPLICATION OF THE INTRA-UNION
]EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE TO SECTION 301 LITIGATION

A. The Section 301 Suit in Perspective
The crucial question explored in this part is whether the
requirement that aggrieved employees exhaust intra-union remedies
prior to initiating section 301 litigation in fact promotes any legitimate policies. First, however, it is important to understand the
basic legal principles involved in a section 301 suit.
Section 301 authorizes "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 18 Although other
parties may also initiate litigation under the section, 9 this Article
is concerned only with actions by individual workers against their
employers, actions which seek to vindicate their "uniquely personal
rights" created by collective bargaining agreements. 2 0 These personal rights-including wage and seniority rights and the right not
to be discharged without just cause-are owed by the employer to
the employees as individuals. The employee's principal complaint
in section 301 litigation is always the employer's alleged breach of
contract. To be sure, the union has also presumably injured him
by its failure to secure relief for him pursuant to the grievance
machinery customarily provided in the collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, in most cases only the employer can provide
the employee with the full remedy he seeks; the employee's primary
dispute is with his employer, not with his union.
IsLabor Management Relations Act §301(a), 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1976).
19 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (recognizing20 union's standing to assert under § 301 the rights of individuals it represents).
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). The line
of cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized the individual employee's right

to bring § 301 actions against his employer includes Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); and Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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The union's role in the section 301 action stems from a tension
in the law. Section 301 provides for judicial enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement, but Congress has also declared a
preference for the settlement of contract disputes through grievance
procedures established by the parties.2 1 If section 301 plaintiffs
could proceed directly into court, this preference for private settlement would be undermined and the courts would be inundated
with section 301 actions. As a result, the Supreme Court has
molded a body of decisional law to accommodate the roles of private
settlement and formal adjudication and has introduced unfair union
representation as a threshold requirement for judicial review.
In the Steelworkers Trilogy,22 the Supreme Court limited the
role of the judiciary to determining whether grievances are arbitrable. Only if no arbitration procedure covers the dispute in
question can the courts decide a case on its merits. If arbitration
is available, a court can only require the parties to arbitrate, and
it then can enforce arbitral awards. Thereafter, in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 23 the Court extended the Trilogy logic to section

301 suits initiated by individual employees and imposed the requirement that employees exhaust their remedies under the contract
grievance machinery before bringing suit. Because most unions
exercise exclusive control over contract grievance processing, however, unlimited judicial deference to the results would leave the
employee vulnerable to arbitrary union conduct. Therefore, in
Vaca v. Sipes,24 the Court held that an employee should be excused

from this exhaustion requirement when he can show that the union
violated its "duty of fair representation" 25 in its handling of his
21
Labor Management Relations Act §173(d) (1976) provides inter alia:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be

the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes .

"

22United Steelworkers v. Enterprise WTheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23379

U.S. 650 (1965).

24386 U.S. 171 (1967).
25The "duty of fair representation" was developed by the Supreme Court over
many years. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944) (under Railway Labor Act). The obligation was necessitated by §9
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976), which grants unions
exclusive representative status for all bargaining-unit employees and, consequently,
renders the employees vulnerable to arbitrary union conduct. The duty of fair
representation was designed to serve as a "bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182. Thus, although
this duty is not explicitly provided by statute, it is generally said to be statutory
in origin and nature. Id. 193. See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119 (1973); Cox, The Duty
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grievance. And finally, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,26
the Court extended Vaca to situations in which the union has
processed the employee's claim through the final step of the grievance procedure, ruling that when an employee can show that his
union breached its duty of fair representation, judicial deference
to the arbitral award pursuant to the Trilogy is inappropriate.
As a result, the typical section 301 action brought by an individual employee has two tiers: the employee must first prove that
his union acted wrongfully in processing, or failing to process, his
grievance, and only then may he present his contract claim against
the employer. The unfair-representation claim plays a distinctly
subordinate, albeit threshold, role in the litigation: the plaintiff's
principal objective in nearly every case is to obtain a hearing of his
contract claim. The union is made a party to the action essentially
to aid the court in determining the justiciability of that underlying
claim.

27

This is not to say that unions are totally immune from liability
to section 301 plaintiffs for their wrongful handling of valid contract grievances. Under the damage formula announced in Vaca,
however, the union is liable only to the extent that its misconduct
aggravated the original injury caused by the employer's breach of
the collective agreement.28 Thus, union liability, if any, can be
calculated only with reference to the underlying contract claim;
indeed, if that claim proves unfounded, the union may escape any
liability, though it mishandled the grievance.29 Moreover, in pracof Fair Representation, 2 ViL. L. 1Ev. 151 (1957); Feller, supra note 1; Summers,
The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. 11v. 251 (1977).
26424 U.S. 554 (1976).
27See Dor v. Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
("In such actions, the employee's claim against his union is frequently only a
necessary steppingstone, mandated by Vaca v. Sipes . . . to an examination of his
real grievance, the discharge by the employer"); Harrison v. Arrow Metal Products
Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 627, 174 N.W.2d 875, 891 (1969) (concurring and
dissenting opinion) (despite unfair-representation allegations, the "gravamen" of a
section 301 complaint is the employer breach of contract).
28386 U.S. at 197-98.
29 Cf. Kaiser v. Local 83, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.
1978). In Kaiser, a district court granted an employer's unopposed motion for
summary judgment when the plaintiff-employee admitted that his discharge was
not based on any of the grounds specified in the collective bargaining agreement
as improper. Id. 645. The court also granted summary judgment for the union,
apparently accepting the union's contention that it could not have breached its
duty of fair representation when it failed to process the plaintiff's unmeritorious
grievance. Id. 644. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment
granted to the union; it rejected the district court's determination that, as a matter
of law, a union cannot be liable under its duty of fair representation if the
underlying claim against the employer is without merit. Holding also that neither
an employer nor a union is an indispensable party in an action against the other by
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tice, the contribution of union misconduct to section 301 damages
is generally judged to be relatively small. Unfair representation
in the section 301 action is therefore nothing more than a screening
device, a standard for determining "under what circumstances the
individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-ofcontract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures." 30
The role of the duty of fair representation in section 301 litgation thus sets it clearly apart from other union obligations which
fall under the general heading of "duty of fair representation."
Consider, for example, the duty that attaches when a union negotiates, rather than administers, a collective bargaining agreement.
Unfair representation in contract negotiations involves misconduct
only by the union; the employer has violated no legal duty. In
such situations, responsibility for providing aggrieved employees
with a remedy should fall primarily, if not exclusively, upon the
union; in contrast to the typical section 301 suit, the main dispute
is between the individual employee and his union bargaining agent,
rather than between the employee and the employer.3 1 This fundamental distinction has been completely overlooked by courts which
have invoked the intra-union exhaustion doctrine. We note it here
only to emphasize the unique and subordinate role that unfair-representation claims customarily play in section 301 suits by individual
workers to remedy employer violations of contract.
Against this background of a complex, two-tiered action for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, we turn now to the
question whether the policies cited by the courts to support the
intra-union exhaustion doctrine are, in fact, promoted by its application. We first consider those benefits said to flow to the courts
and plaintiffs and then address those relevant to union and employer interests.
an employee-union member, the Ninth Circuit remanded for trial of the issue
whether the union breached its duty of fair representation. It is at least theoretically
possible, then, for the union to breach its duty even though the employer has not
violated the contract-that is, the union can handle an unmeritorious grievance in
an arbitrary manner. If, however, we accept the Vaca formula which measures
a union's liability by its aggravation of a preexisting injury, it is difficult to perceive

what 3 relief could be awarded. See note 85 infra.
oVaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 185.
31 See, e.g., Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978); Brady

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1048 (1969) (under Railway Labor Act); Steele v. Brewery & Soft Drink Local
1162, 432 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ind. 1977).

Another variety of unfair representation distinguishable from that in section 301
litigation involves a union's use of agency-shop fees for political purposes. See,
e.g., Reid v. UAW, District Lodge 1083, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
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B. Putative Benefits of Intra-Union Exhaustion
to Employees and Courts
The requirement that intra-union appeals be exhausted supposedly serves the interests of both individual employees and the
courts because "such procedures will quickly resolve disputes without the delay inherent in the judicial process and with the aid of
persons experienced at resolving member-union conflicts short of a
full-blown judicial proceeding." 32 Moreover, exhaustion ostensibly
permits the courts to avoid committing judicial resources in a field
in which others are said to possess expertise. 33 But, dissecting these
claims of benefit, we can ask:
1. Do intra-union appeals offer prompt relief?
2. Can intra-union appeals resolve disputes and afford
complete relief, thus eliminating the need for subsequent litigation?
3. Can intra-union appeals afford partial relief, thereby
facilitating subsequent judicial disposition?
Let us examine each question in turn.
1. Offer of Prompt Relief
Most intra-union appeals procedures involve a series of steps:
an appearance before the local-union executive board, a committee,
or the whole membership of the local; review by one or more intermediate authorities; and a final appeal to the union's constitutional
convention. This process can drag on for years, particularly when
appeals must be taken to conventions which may be held as infrequently as once every five years 34 and are rarely held more often
than once every two or three years.3 5 Nonetheless, these delays
32

Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975).

Id.
See, e.g., Constitution and Bylaws of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, art. 1I, § 1 (adopted in June 1976). The five-year maximum interval
between conventions can be explained in part by reference to title IV of the
LMRDA, which requires the election of national or international union officers no
less often. LMRDA §401(a), 29 U.S.C. §481(a) (1976). Thus, if officers are
elected at conventions rather than by referenda, conventions must be held at least
every fifth year.
35A sampling of union constitutions in effect in early 1979 reveals the
following intervals between conventions: Constitution & Bylaws of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, art. I, § 1 (adopted in June 1976) (5 years); Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, art. JE, § 1 (as
amended Sept. 1974) (4 years); Constitution of the Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers
International Union, § 204 (Oct. 1976) (3 years); Constitution of United Steel33

34
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have not discouraged the courts from invoking the intra-union ex3
haustion doctrine to dismiss section 301 actions. 6
The delay involved in the appeals procedure could be reduced
if the courts were willing to accept something less than complete
exhaustion of intra-union appeals. Indeed, some courts in section
301 cases have held that, if the union has had a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charge of unfair representation, plaintiffs
need only attempt to secure a union remedy rather than pursue
every formal procedure.3 Generally, however, there are no courtimposed time limits: "[E]very available remedy within the labor
organization must be exhausted by members before the aid of the
.. 38 Although several courts have
courts can be invoked ..
elected to hear section 301 suits when the plaintiffs had spent years
attempting unsuccessfully to secure relief through intra-union channels,3 9 no guidelines have emerged to assist employees in determining when they may safely abandon their union appeals in favor
of section 301 adjudication by the courts. As a result, employees
wondering how long to pursue intra-union appeals are well advised
to persevere until every appellate procedure specified in the union
constitution has been exhausted.
The absence of any time limit on the exhaustion requirement
is particularly curious given the four-month time limit for exhausting intra-union appeals contained in the LMRDA title I exhaustion
workers, art. VI, § 1 (adopted in Sept. 1976) (2 years); Constitution of the Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers, art. III, §2 (adopted in Aug. 1977) (2 years);
Constitution of the Communications Workers of America, art. VIII, § 1 (as amended
June 1977) (1 year). The United Autoworkers convention appeals committee meets
semiannually. Constitution of the International Union, UAW, art. 33, § 8 (adopted
in May 1977).
36 E.g., Ditzler v. International Ass'n of Machinists Local Lodge No. 1984, 453
F. Supp. 50, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
37

See, e.g., Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp., 571 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(formal procedures not mandatory if informal efforts sufficient to demonstrate

futility); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (diligent
processing of intra-union proceedings for 27 months sufficient); Gray v. International
Ass'n Heat & Frost Insulators Workers Local 51, 447 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1971)

(plaintiff confronted union president at monthly meeting and was told he had no

grounds to press charges; plaintiff then pressed grievance through letters to local
and international union; sufficient to excuse exhaustion). But see Morin v.
General Motors Corp., 91 L.R.R.M. 2578 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (informal letter-

writing campaign to union officials over period of five years not sufficient to excuse
exhaustion of formal intra-union remedies).

See note 67 infra.

38Foley v. Chrysler Corp., 78 L.R.R.M. 2744 (S.D. Ind. 1971).

In Anderson

v. Ford Motor Co., 319 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Mich. 1970), and Cacavas v. General
Motors Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 2841 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), the plaintiffs' complaints

were dismissed for failure to appeal to the union convention before filing suit

though they had pursued their intra-union appeals unsuccessfully through the

UAW executive board and the public review board.
39 See cases cited in note 37 supra.
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proviso, 40 which is frequently cited as authority for dismissing
section 801 actions. With the exception of dictum in several
opinions, courts have not recognized this time limit.4 '

Moreover,

although the title I exhaustion requirement is permissive and, indeed, is frequently waived by courts handling LMRDA disputes, 42
exhaustion is generally said to be mandatory in the section 801
context.

43

As one court has observed, "the most frequent result of this
additional exhaustion requirement may unfortunately be the 'exhaustion' of deserving employees before they are able to obtain
judicial relief." 44 Indeed, the courts that have applied the intraunion exhaustion doctrine to dismiss section 301 suits regrettably
have ignored the possibility that the relevant statute of limitations
for filing such actions 45 may lapse while union appeals are being
4

OLMRDA §101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (1976):
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any adminis-

trative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its
officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as
a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to
petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided,
That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such
organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against
such organizations or any officer thereof ....
See text accompanying notes 96-130 infra for a discussion of the propriety of
reliance on the exhaustion proviso in § 301 litigation.
41
See, e.g., Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1978);
Larimer v. United Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 428 F. Supp. 8, 12 (E.D. Tenn. 1976);
Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 308 (D. Del. 1973); Thompson
v. New York Central R. Co., 250 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (under
Railway Labor Act).
42
See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391
U.S. 418, 426 (1968); Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d
375, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43
Compare the difference in approach and result in Semancik v. UMW
District 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972); McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen,
341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965), and Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists,
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), all cases involving Title I rights, with cases arising
under § 301, e.g., Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978);
Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1978); and
Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
44 Dora v. Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Cf. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418,
425 (1968) (no justification for making public processes wait until union member
exhausts inadequate internal procedures).
45 See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(timeliness of a
section 301 suit is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to
the appropriate state statute of limitations); Note, Statutes of Limitations Governing Fair Representation Action Against Union When Brought With Section 301
Action Against Employer, 44 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 418 (1976).
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pursued.46 Should the statutory period expire during the appeals
process, the judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would not
simply delay the section 301 plaintiff, but deprive him of his right
to sue. Perhaps the courts' equitable power to toll the statute of
limitations pending appeal within the union could be invoked to
avoid this harsh result,47 but one would think that a medicine with
side effects severe enough to cause the patient's demise would be
prescribed with greater care.
The disadvantages of the delay that accompanies exhaustion of
intra-union appeals of course might be offset by advantages. For
example, if union appeals could resolve the dispute and fully compensate the aggrieved employee in no less time than a federal
district court would require to afford relief, there might be a valid
reason for requiring exhaustion of union remedies. Hence, we
turn our attention to this possibility, mindful that if intra-union
appeals cannot afford complete relief, section 301 litigation will
still be necessary. Should complete relief be unavailable, application of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine would actually postpone, rather than expedite, final resolution of the employee's section
301 controversy.
2. Avoidance of Litigation by Affording Complete Relief
Our analysis of this issue will assume that the contract grievance procedure can no longer be reactivated to consider and resolve
the employee's dispute, either because the contract statute of limitations has run or because the procedure has already yielded a "final"
46 The

courts disagree about whether a tort or contract statute of limitations

should apply in a section 301 action in which the union and employer are joined
as defendants. See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d
442, 448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (Missouri five-year contract

statute of limitations adopted); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114
(5th Cir. 1973) (Alabama's one-year tort statute of limitations adopted); Smart
v. Ellis Trucking Co., 409 F. Supp. 129, 132 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d
215 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979) (Michigan three-year tort

statute of limitations adopted).

A number of courts have found that the

applicable statute of limitations is that governing actions for violation of rights
created by statute (often three years). E.g., Price v. Southern Pac. Transp., 586

F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978) (under Railway Labor Act).

When employees have

sought, however, to upset final arbitral awards under Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), on the ground that the union breached its duty
of fair representation in prosecuting the grievance, some courts have applied a
90-day statute of limitations found in arbitration statutes. E.g., Wallace v.
A.T.&T., 460 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
47
See Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(statute of limitations tolled during pendency of intra-union appeal); cf. Jenkins v.
General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 309 n.10 (D. Del. 1973) (stay would be
of no avail). But see Morin v. General Motors Corp., 91 L.R.R.M. 2578 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (plaintiff's argument that statute of limitations should have been

tolled during period in which he attempted to exhaust union appeals rejected).
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decision. 48 Indeed, this is a legitimate assumption because most
contracts contain fairly rigorous time limits for initiating and
processing grievances 4 9 Normally, these limits will have expired
long before the employee hires a lawyer and initiates a section 301
action. In such circumstances, we must ask whether the union
itself can, or is likely to, provide the employee with complete relief.
To answer this question, we must focus upon both the nature and
amount of the relief sought and the authority of the union tribunal.
Nearly all union constitutions provide for some appeal from
decisions at lower levels of the union hierarchy. However, just as
contract grievance machinery is designed to resolve disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements, union appeals procedures
are designed to settle disputes arising under the union constitution
and bylaws. Typically, these disputes involve the discipline of a
member for allegedly violating certain obligations owed to the
union as a political institution, such as the duty to pay dues, to
conduct oneself responsibly at meetings, or to honor no-strike commitments or authorized picket lines. Most union tribunals are limited to imposing sanctions, such as reprimand, fine, suspension, or expulsion, against offending members; they are powerless to award
relief in favor of injured members. 50 The appeals procedure is
designed to protect, and the sanctions to benefit, the union, rather
than any member or group of members. Fines are customarily payable to the union treasury, and few union constitutions authorize
48

See text accompanying notes 138-145 infra for a discussion of the exceptional
case in which the contract grievance procedure can be reactivated.
49
Feller, supra note 1, at 752 (footnote omitted):
The time for initiation of ordinary grievances usually ranges from two
days to two months; in discharge cases the normal limits vary from one
day to a week. Time limits for appealing may be provided at the intermediate steps . . . . The most typical penalty for failure to meet the
time limits is, in the case of initial filing, that the grievance shall not be
considered at all, and at the subsequent steps, that it shall be deemed
settled on the basis of managements response at the previous step.
See also Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 435 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 581
F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978) (arbitration request must be filed within 15 days of
decision at third step of grievance procedure); White v. Remsco Management, Inc.,
91 L.R.t.M. 2647 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (one working day to grieve discharge); Dora
v. Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ten days to file
written request for arbitration).
Clearly, if the contract statute of limitations has not already run at the time
the employee learns that his grievance has been withdrawn or dropped, it will
almost certainly have run by the time an intra-union appeal has been heard, not
to mention the time required to exhaust all union appeals.
5
oSee Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
In contrast, when officers of a local union are found to have abused their official
responsibilities to the union or its members, the discipline most often meted out
is removal from office or imposition of trusteeship by an officer or tribunal of the
national union.
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appeals tribunals to award money damages to individual members
from the union treasury. 51
Rarely have courts in section 301 cases bothered to scrutinize
the intra-union appeals process before finding exhausion of the
process a prerequisite to filing suit. Generally, the courts have
been satisfied by the mere existence of some procedure in the union
constitution for appealing decisions by local officials. Indeed, some
courts have even been content to rely upon findings by other courts
that such procedures exist. 2 In a welcome exception, the Seventh
Circuit, in Orphan v. Furnco Construction Corp.,53 reversed a

district-court dismissal for failure to exhaust intra-union procedures
after concluding that the constitution of the Bricklayers and Stone
Masons provided only for "criminal-type prosecutions against Union
members and officers"-prosecutions designed to impose penalties
upon the guilty, not to afford relief to the injured.5 4 Thus, the
court in Orphan reasoned, it was not a procedure that "so certainly
holds out the prospect of . . . relief that the plaintiffs could justi-

fiably be expected to have recourse to it before filing suit." 55 In
[act, the internal procedures of most unions differ very little from
those of the Bricklayers,5 6 but the Orphan decision remains, for the
51 Cf. Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir.

1977) (court recognized that Teamster tribunals could not award money damages
but found that they could grant type of specific relief sought, an order that union
process grievances in nondiscriminatory fashion in future).
s2 E.g., Ditzler v. International Ass'n of Machinists Local 1984, 453 F. Supp.
50, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1978), citing Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87,

104 n.57 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) (under Railway
Labor Act), which, in turn, had relied upon International Ass'n of Machinists v.

Friedman, 252 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 926 (1958), for the
proposition that the appeals procedures of the IAM were adequate. See a/so
Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965) (under

Railway Labor Act) (Railway Clerks' procedures); Fabian v. Freight Drivers Local

557, 448 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Md. 1978) (Teamster procedures). But see
Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1274, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1972)

(under Railway Labor Act), in which the court found the .AMprocedure "completely shrouded in the discretionary power of the Union, the actual party against
whom the real complaint is made."
53466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
54 Id.801.

5Id. Contra, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 311 (6th
Cir. 1975) ("intra-Union remedies are part and parcel of the industrial in-house
procedure for settling labor disputes"). This finding by the Sixth Circuit was

based neither upon cited authority nor on an investigation by the court into the
procedures or remedies available within unions.
56 See, e.g., Constitution & Bylaws of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, art. XIX (adopted in June 1976), particularly its "relief" provision, § 9(a),
which reads:

Decisions and penalties imposed upon individual members, officers, elected
Business Agents, Local Unions, Joint Councils or other subordinate bodies
found guilty of charges may consist of reprimands, fines, suspensions, ex-
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most part, atypical. This does not, however, prevent union counsel
from attempting to derail the member's suit with creative interpretations of the union constitution which may never have been
57
adopted or applied by the union or its appeals tribunals.
Even if we assume that unions are constitutionally authorized
to do more than just fine, suspend, or expel "guilty" members, that
they can actually award an aggrieved member monetary relief, they
would still be unable to eliminate the need for subsequent judicial
proceedings in section 301 actions. First, money damages for lost
pay are but one form of relief normally sought by section 301
plaintiffs. An unjustly terminated employee may also seek reinstatement to his job, or an employee improperly denied his seniority
may seek to have it restored. Only the employer can provide such
specific or injunctive relief, and once the contract statute of limitations has run, only the courts can satisfy these claims. When such
claims are involved, the employee must proceed to court regardless
of what the union does.
Even assuming that the employee's claim could be satisfied by a
damage award, however, subsequent litigation against the employer
could be avoided only if a union were willing to pick up the entire
tab and thus bear the burden of the employer's liability as well as
its own. Most unions, however, have exceedingly tight budgets
which do not allow for the payment of sizable damage awards. Of
course, a union might conceivably agree to bear this burden if a
pulsions, revocations, denial to hold any office permanently or for a fixed
period or commands to do or perform, or refrain from doing or performing, specified acts.
Courts have recognized that the Teamsters' constitution does not permit union
tribunals to award damages for unfair representation. See Miller v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2591, 2593 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1980); Winter v. Local
639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 149, 151 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Fabian v. Freight Drivers Local 557, 448 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Md. 1978). In
Miller, the district court had granted summary judgment in favor of both the
union and the employer on the ground that Miller had failed to exhaust first his
internal union remedies. Because Miller's appeal from the grant of summary
judgment for the union was dismissed by the court of appeals as untimely, however,
only the judgment in favor of the employer was actually before the court. Although
these circumstances certainly limit what may properly be considered the court's
holding, in fact the court found a review of the relief available from the union
essential to its disposition of the suit against the employer.
See also IBEW Constitution, art. XXVII, § 1 (as amended Sept. 1974);
Constitution of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, art. XII, § 1 (adopted in
Aug. 1977); Constitution of United Steelworkers, art. XII, §§ 1, 2 (adopted in
Sept. 1976).
571n Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1974), for
example, counsel for the International Union of Electricians argued, albeit unsuccessfully in this instance, that "a fine levied against the offending party or
parties in an amount payable to plaintiff in order to make him 'whole' would [not]
be . . . beyond the definitional boundaries of the word 'discipline."' Id. 145
(quoting memorandum of union).
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full settlement would tax its treasury less than the attorney fees it
would otherwise incur defending itself in a section 301 action.
Aside from this remote possibility, however, it is absurd to suggest
that unions would even consider paying for injuries resulting from
an employer's breach of contract. As the Supreme Court observed
in Vaca v. Sipes, "It could be a real hardship on the union to pay
these damages, even if the union were given a right of indemnification against the employer . . . . [W]e see no merit in requiring
the union to pay the employer's share of the damages." s
Thus, it appears, nearly all aggrieved employees ultimately will
be forced into court. Some grievants will be faced immediately
with the fact that their union constitution does not authorize the
award of monetary damages under even the most creative interpretation by union counsel. In instances in which the union can
award money damages, the union's unwillingness or inability to
bear the employer's share of the liability-by far, the larger portion
-will still necessitate that the employee file a section 301 action to
obtain relief from his employer. 59 Perhaps most important, even if
the union could and would award monetary damages for the entire
injury, much of his claim may require relief that only a court can
provide. 60 Therefore, application of the intra-union exhaustion
doctrine to aggrieved employees seeking damages and injunctive
relief from their employers actually delays final adjudication of the
employer's potential liability to the employee. The delay may well
aggravate the employee's injury, and the damages continue to accrue
in the meantime. Neither justice nor judicial economy is promoted.
3. Facilitation of Disposition of Subsequent Litigation
Even though intra-union appeals will, in most cases, fail to
eliminate entirely the need for judicial proceedings, it still may be
asserted that such appeals will contribute to a partial resolution of
the section 301 controversy by disposing of the unfair-representation
claim. By severing the claim against the union, the court's task is
simplified and the aggrieved employee obtains partial relief from
the union for its wrongdoing. The employee's claim-at least that
part of his claim that concerns the union-will be reviewed, this
3S 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967) (footnote omitted); Miller v. Gateway Transp.
Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2591, 2593 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980).
59 Indeed, even if a union constitution were to authorize compensation of
members injured as a result of officers' constitutional violations, the provision would
not necessarily authorize an award of damages for breach of an officer's statutory
duty of fair representation.
60
Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F. Supp. at 145.
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argument assumes, by tribunals with some expertise in resolving
such disputes. At best, the court is spared an excursion into areas
in which its expertise is limited; at worst, the issues are sharpened,
thus simplifying the judicial task. In practice, however, the courts
cannot reasonably depend upon, let alone defer to, union tribunals
for disposition of unfair-representation allegations.
The probability of bias is an initial reason to doubt the capability of union tribunals to resolve claims of unfair representation.
Union tribunals are not detached judicial bodies resolving disputes
brought before them according to fixed rules and firm precedents. 61
They are political bodies composed of union officials, and it is not
unfair to say that they will consider the political and financial interests of the union foremost in their disposition of any unfair62
representation claim.
The first step in most intra-union procedures is an appeal to
the local, to the very officials alleged to have mishandled the employee's grievance. Nonetheless, a claim of union hostility or bias
at the local level has generally not been sufficient to persuade the
courts to excuse failure to exhaust intra-union appeals.6 3 Indeed,
even a showing of implacable hostility at the local level may not
suffice if the court perceives the possibility of impartial review at
another level of the union hierarchy.64 As a practical matter, how6

72-75 infra (possibility of review by impartial tribunal).
The political interests of the union can also find expression on the job in
direct reprisals against an employee or in withdrawal of union protection. Because
the requirement of intra-union exhaustion prolongs the period during which a
member may be subject to union hostility without outside impartial support, he
may be unwilling to run the gauntlet of intra-union appeals and thus may be
discouraged from vindicating his contract rights. Although federal labor policy
may favor the private settlement of labor disputes, it surely may not be said to
favor effective denial of employee access to the courts. Cf. Lacy v. Freight
Employees Local 667, 99 L.R.R.M. 2403 (W.D. Tenn. 1978), appeal docketed,
No. C-74-454 (6th Cir. June 27, 1978) (scheduled for oral argument April 17,
1980) (union fined member $2000 as discipline for filing grievances subsequently
decided against him and for filing suit against union for unfair representation in
which union spent $1500 on attorneys' fees); Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 477 F. Supp.
149 (M.D. Pa.), appeal filed, No. 78-1035 (3d Cir. Oct. 12, 1979) (local fined
member $2635 to recover its costs in defending suit by member).
63 Most courts presume, without inquiry, that review by higher union tribunals
will be impartial. For example, in Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385
F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 937 (1975), the court simply concluded: "Where, as here, there exist internal
procedures providing reasonably prompt review of adverse decisions by union
levels higher than those responsible for the decisions, this Court's entertainment of
an employee's suit in spite of his failure to utilize these procedures would undercut
the policy [favoring non-judicial resolution] . ..." Id. 699. See also Harrington
v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
64
E.g., Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bid. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) ("[tlhe cases that have excused failure to exhaust on this ground . . .
have involved quite extreme facts. Evidently, in order to prevail on this ground,
1 Cf. notes

62
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ever, there are likely to be strong ties of interest between local
officers and the national union officials who may later be required
to evaluate the conduct of their local colleagues. To be sure, the
politics in each union differ, and there may even be situations in
which national union officials are politically hostile toward local
officers whose conduct in processing a grievance is before them on
review, but normally the administrators of any organization will
65
unite to resist challenges to their authority posed by outsiders.
Clearly, a claim of unfair representation may appear as just such
a challenge. Moreover, in some cases, there may be a political conflict important to the international union underlying the unfairrepresentation claim-for example, when the grievant is a member
of an opposition group within the union which management would
also like to discourage.
Furthermore, decisions by union tribunals at any level are
likely to be tempered by a concern for the union's potential liability as well as by political considerations. Although this form of
bias may be less pronounced when national union entities cannot
be made to assume and discharge liabilities incurred by locals, one
may safely assume that national union officers-a number of whom
simultaneously hold office at lower levels of the union-will be
reluctant to impose financial liability upon any entity within their
union.6 6 Therefore, even when an intra-union appeal may be taken
to officials not directly involved in the questioned conduct, it is
unwise to presume that bias will not render the appeal futile.67
[the plaintiff] must make a specific and convincing showing of union animus")
(footnotes omitted). Accord, Pawlak v. Teamsters Local 764, 444 F. Supp. 807,
811 (M.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978); Brookins v. Chrysler
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 566 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
65
This form of prejudice may be eliminated by providing for review by truly
impartial individuals or tribunals, such as the United Auto Workers' Public Review
Board. Courts have failed to recognize, however, that judicial deference to such
impartial arbiters should not be extended to other union tribunals. With few
exceptions, the numerous decisions extending the intra-union exhaustion doctrine
to litigation involving the UAW have been routinely cited as precedent in cases
involving other unions lacking impartial arbitral bodies in their appellate structure.
But see text accompanying notes 72-75 infra for a discussion of the difficulties that
arise with even impartial tribunals.
66 Typically, union funds are devoted entirely, either directly or indirectly, to
providing all members with representation. Most union officers probably perceive
the diversion of the union's limited funds to benefit an individual or small group
as impairing the union's potential effectiveness and as compromising the collective
interests of the membership. See generally IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48-52
(1979) (under Railway Labor Act).
67 A corollary to the exhaustion doctrine is, of course, that exhaustion will not
be excused unless the plaintiff can meet the burden of proving that internal union
appeals would be futile. See, e.g., Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852, 855
(6th Cir. 1978); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184-85 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Manica v. Chrysler Corp., 97 L.R.R.M. 2679,
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Also, given the incentives to deny employee appeals challenging the
conduct of union officers in processing grievances, union tribunals
may well be inclined to cloud or distort the issues, rather than to
sharpen them, and to fashion decisions exonerating the union with
the expectation of judicial deference should the aggrieved employee
later bring suit. Carefully drafted decisions by union tribunals or
their skilled legal counsel undoubtedly represent an effective way
for unions to protect their interests. Obviously, little judicial
credence should be given to the findings or conclusions contained
in adverse decisions rendered by union tribunals. 8
Let us assume for a moment that bias and hostility do not infect the intra-union appeals procedure and that, as a result, this
impulse to distort issues is absent. Can courts expect an intra-union
appeal to aid their disposition of section 301 actions even in these
circumstances?

We must recall that the threshold issue raised by

the typical section 301 action initiated by an individual employee
is whether his union breached its duty of fair representation when
processing his grievance. The second issue is whether the employer
denied the employee his rights in breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 69
Clearly, because unions both negotiate and administer labor
agreements, they have some expertise in construing the terms of
such contracts. On the other hand, it is equally clear that union
tribunals do not possess any expertise in determining whether their
2681 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 435 F. Supp. 264, 268
(N.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); Cubas v.
Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see Jenkins v.
General Motors Corp., 84 L.R.R.M. 2643, 2648 n.10 (D. Del. 1973) (dismissal for
failure to exhaust despite "fact that plaintiff appears clearly to have lost his right
to pursue his internal union remedies"). Few courts have shifted to the union
the burden of proving that its procedures do, in fact, hold out a clear prospect of
affording complete relief. See, e.g., Frederickson v. System Fed'n No. 114, 436
F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1970) (under Railway Labor Act); Dom v. Meyers
Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 785-86 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Foust v. IBEW,
572 F.2d 710, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 442 U.S.
42 (1979) (under Railway Labor Act); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d
795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators
Local0 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 1972).
8There remains the distinct possibility that union appeals will not yield
reasoned, written opinions. Generally, there are few procedures binding union
tribunals and there is no requirement that their decisions be in writing or that
their conclusions be supported by findings or analysis. Although a record of the
intra-union proceeding might afford some insights, intra-union procedures are
generally, and necessarily, informal, and a usable record is rarely produced. In
fact, testimony ordinarily is not taken under oath and evidence may be admitted
or excluded as the tribunal or presiding officer may see fit. See generally International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 244-46 (1971); Ritz v.
O'Donnell, 566 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 464 F. Supp.
1265 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Rosario v. Dolgen, 441 F. Supp. 657 (8.D.N.Y. 1977).
69 See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
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own conduct in processing an employee's grievance may have violated the duty of fair representation. Were that duty one established by the union constitution, the courts might justifiably
defer to the union's determination whether the duty has been
violated, just as final determination of violations of collective bargaining agreements is normally left to arbitrators. The duty of
fair representation is, however, a statutory doctrine, refined by
courts, not by unions. That union tribunals are more qualified
than courts to construe public law or to apply a preeminently judicial doctrine is patently incorrect. 70 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that "the courts are . . . the primary guardians
of the duty of fair representation." 71

Unions might, of course, structure their appeals process to include review by a board of impartial outsiders, including lawyers
or jurists with a substantial understanding of the duty of fair
representation. The United Auto Workers has attempted this with
its public review board. Even so, before giving decisions by such
tribunals any weight, the courts should assure themselves that the
standard of fair representation applied by such tribunals matches
the duty defined by the judiciary. Indeed, decisions of the UAW
Public Review Board are defective in precisely this respect. David
Klein, counsel to the review board, has acknowledged that its jurisdiction is limited to those unfair-representation claims which allege
bad faith. 72 The judicially recognized standard is not nearly so
confined. 73 Thus, although nearly fifty percent of the reported
decisions requiring employees to exhaust intra-union appeals have
involved auto workers, 74 given the limited jurisdiction of the review
board, little or no judicial weight can ultimately be assigned to its
decisions rejecting unfair-representation claims.75
70 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (union
and employee interests not always harmonious; union's exclusive control over
grievance procedure of concern); Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F. Supp. 139,
145 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (claim against union for breach of duty of fair representation
can only be resolved in court of law). See note 25 supra for a discussion of the
origins of the duty of fair representation.
71 Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27 (1970).
72
Klein, supra note 6, at 99. See Harrison v. Arrow Metal Prod. Corp., 20
Mich. App. 590, 624, 174 N.W.2d 875, 892 (1969) (concurring and dissenting
opinion).
73See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967) ("arbitrary" or "perfunctory" handling of grievances contsitutes breach of the duty of fair representation); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975)
("negligent" handling of grievances subjects union to liability for breach of duty);
Klein, supra note 6, at 99.
74 Authors' estimate.

7- Cf. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976)

(court ordered terminated employee to exhaust UAW appeals procedure, but
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Indeed, the public review board may in one respect present an
unusually favorable picture of union-tribunal handling of unfairrepresentation claims. Its narrow definition of the duty of fair
representation has been acknowledged, and its determinations may
be evaluated accordingly. Other union tribunals may well follow
the review board in regarding the obligation imposed by the union's
duty of fair representation as substantially less than that imposed
by the courts. But, because most union tribunals keep no records
of their proceedings and issue no written decisions, it may be impossible for a court to determine what standard of duty was applied.76 It is therefore difficult to perceive how requiring exhaustion of intra-union appeals simplifies the courts' task of reviewing
alleged union violations of the duty of fair representation.
Despite these difficulties one may still inquire if intra-union
appeals will at least assist the court in determining whether challenged employer conduct was in breach of contract. The answer is
probably not. First, conduct of a union officer processing a member's grievance, not employer conduct, lies at the heart of the intraunion appeal. Although the member might base his claim of unfair representation on an assertion that the employer's conduct was
so obviously in breach of contract that the union's refusal to process
his grievance was necessarily arbitrary, the union tribunal need not
consider the contract claim before finding that the union's action
77
did not give rise to any liability.
On the other hand, any intra-union award for unfair representation presumably must be based on the underlying breach of
the collective bargaining agreement. According to the formula for
allocating liability between employers and unions announced by
the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, the union is responsible to the
retained jurisdiction in event claims not settled by such means). One may even
question whether the courts should require exhaustion of UAW procedures in
light of the narrow standard of review and the fact, conceded by David Klein,
that in the more than 20 years of the public review board's existence, only one
appeal has resulted in a finding of breach of the duty of fair representation. Under
such circumstances, the possibility of securing a remedy is so remote that even
this most enlightened of all intra-union appellate structures is fatally defective.
76 See note 9 supra.
77 In a related manner, a number of courts have held that a "plaintiff can not
establish a breach of duty simply by proving his underlying grievance was
meritorious:' Cooper v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 13, 17 (S.D.
ind. 1976). See, e.g., Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648
(10th Cir. 1973); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299
(5th Cir. 1972) (under Railway Labor Act); Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 396
F. Supp. 52, 57 (E.D. Mich. 1973), af'd, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
But see Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558,
421 U.S. 988 (1975).
561 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1975) ("proof of a grievances merit
is circumstantial evidence that the failure to process the claim constituted bad
faith").
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aggrieved employee only insofar as its breach of duty aggravated
his preexisting injury.7 8 Indirectly, therefore, the intra-union exhaustion doctrine requires the union tribunal to determine whether
a breach of contract has occurred because, absent a breach, the
union would not be liable for its conduct in violation of the duty
of fair representation. Courts cannot, however, expect union tribunals to decide that the employee's underlying grievance was
plainly meritorious and, on that basis, to make an award of damages
for breach of the duty of fair representation. Rather, this interdependence further assures that the duty of fair representation
claim will not be considered on its merits. Imagine a union's
chagrin when after awarding damages for a breach of its duty of
fair representation, a court later finds that the employer's conduct
did not violate the collective bargaining agreement; therefore
the union need not have paid a penny. It would be reckless indeed for the union to make an award when the contract claim is
in any way questionable. Even when a union has recognized that
a breach of the duty of fair representation has occurred, it might
seek to avoid the issue by fashioning a self-interested decision upholding the employer's conduct or contract interpretation. Again,
it is unlikely that the intra-union appeals process will yield either
relief to aggrieved employees or decisions which will sharpen issues
for judicial disposition.
Finally, let us suppose, despite all the odds against intra-union
appeals decisions in favor of the aggrieved employee, that an employee somehow secures a favorable award. A subsequent judicial
proceeding would still probably not be simplified. Once the union
tribunal has made its award, the employee would still have to sue
under section 301 to seek relief against his employer. Presumably,
he still would have to prove unfair representation by his union.
The court would then have to decide whether the intra-union award
would constitute irrefutable proof of a union breach of the duty of
fair representation, a presumption of wrongdoing, or just evidence.
If we pursue this supposition that union tribunals may actually
award relief to aggrieved employees, an anomaly emerges. Recall
that in the traditional section 301 suit against an employer for
breach of contract, the union serves as the first, and often the most
formidable, line of defense. Few employees succeed in proving
that their union breached its duty of fair representation. If, however, the union could strike a deal with the aggrieved employee by
admitting a fair-representation violation in exchange for a nominal
78

386 U.S. 171, 196-98 (1967).
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money award and a release, the union could avoid both potential
liability and the inevitable attorney fees it would incur participating actively in a section 301 suit. Armed with the union's admission of wrongdoing, the employee would be able to hurdle the
fair-representation obstacle with relative ease and proceed directly
against his employer. Union witnesses, generally inclined to testify
against section 301 plaintiffs, would appear in court to support the
employee's claims. Both employees and their unions would gain
an advantage. Finality of the grievance-arbitration process, an
underlying objective of the Steelworkers Trilogy and the fair-representation doctrine, would, however, suffer. Unless the courts were
to ignore union decisions as untrustworthy, aggrieved employees
would regularly be able to obtain judicial review of their contract
claims against employers. Given the choice, the courts would undoubtedly opt for de novo consideration of the claim of unfair
representation. Moreover, should the intra-union exhaustion doctrine become more firmly entrenched in the section 301 context, the
courts will quite possibly be faced with this choice at some point.
Should these events come to pass, the intra-union exhaustion doctrine certainly would fall quickly from favor.
In summary, intra-union appeals will not resolve the underlying
contractual or statutory dispute and thereby avoid the need for
judicial proceedings. Moreover, the courts are likely to find very
little in prior intra-union appeals to make their burden of investigation and decision any easier. Indeed, by extending the intraunion exhaustion doctrine to issues arising not under union constitutions, but rather under statute and collective bargaining
agreements, the courts may well be undermining the doctrine of
finality of the grievance process. This blow to finality will, in turn,
impose substantial new burdens on the judiciary and dictate prompt
abandonment of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine in section '01
actions.
There remains to evaluate the union and employer interests
cited by courts in support of their application of the intra-union
exhaustion doctrine to section 301 plaintiffs. Although exhaustion
may not resolve the individual plaintiff's dispute, it still might be
justified by promoting some other legitimate interests.
C. Putative Benefits of Intra-Union Exhaustion
to Unions and Employers
Courts have invoked both contract and statutory principles
designed to protect unions to support their extension of the intra-
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union exhaustion doctrine to section 301 cases. Thus, when the
union constitution imposes upon members an obligation to exhaust
internal remedies before seeking judicial recourse against the union,
some courts have said that the employee is contractually bound to
do so. 79 Indeed, most courts following this contract principle have

found that member ignorance of the constitutional exhaustion requirement-even if the requirement is complex or the union has
misled the member about it-will not excuse failure to pursue intraunion appeals.8 0 A number of courts have relied in addition upon
the exhaustion proviso in title I of the LMRDA s1 to find that exhaustion of union procedures avoids "judicial interference with the
internal affairs of a labor organization until it has had at least some
opportunity to resolve disputes concerning its own legitimate affairs." 82 Indeed, it is sometimes said that intra-union exhaustion,
even in the section 301 context, promotes the development of
democratic union processes and responsible self-government.8 3
Employers, on the other hand, have been found, with one narrow exception, to have no legitimate interest in requiring intraunion exhaustion or in pleading plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a
defense. 84 Although employers are undoubtedly the beneficiaries
79 Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965)
(under Railway Labor Act). Accord, Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338,
1342-43 (7th Cir. 1978); Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d
146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1277-78
(7th Cir. 1977); Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927-28 (7th Cir.
1974); Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1974); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 800-01
(7th Cir. 1972); Manica v. Chrysler Corp., 97 L.R.R.M. 2679, 2681 (E.D. Mich.
1978). Cf. Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir.
1978) (non-union-member employee not bound by contract to exhaust internal
union remedies).
S0 Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord,
Ratliff v. Ford Motor Co., 98 L.R.R.M. 2699, 2701-02 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Pawlak
v. Local 764, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 444 F. Supp. 807, 811 (M.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978); Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329, 333
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 435 F. Supp. 264, 267 (N.D.
Ind. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 581 F.2d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1978); Brookins
v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (E.D. Mich. 1974); see also Jenkins v.
General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 309 (D. Del. 1973); Donahue v. Acme
Markets, Inc., 62 L.R.R.M. 2770, 2771 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
SLMRDA §101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (1976). For the text of
the proviso, see note 40 supra.
& Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 104 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) (under Railway Labor Act).
s8 See, e.g., Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967) (under Railway Labor Act); Fabian v. Freight
Drivers Local 557, 448 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Md. 1978).
84Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1979); Fizer v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1978); Winter v. Local 639,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco
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of all judicial barriers to the prosecution of section 301 actions,
they have bargained only for the utilization of contract grievance
machinery and, as a rule, have no standing, to urge a plaintiff's
failure to exhaust union-constitutional procedures as a defense in a
section 301 action. 5 The exception, developed by the Seventh
Circuit in Harrison v. Chrysler Corp.,s6 permits employers to raise
the defense only when they can demonstrate that "an intraunion
appeal could result in reversal of the union's refusal to press the
grievance and that the grievance could be reinstated in accordance
with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." 87 We
will discuss this exceptional situation further in part II.
Although employer interests in requiring intra-union exhaustion can thus be addressed rather summarily, putative union interests demand closer scrutiny. Much of the discussion of union
interest in an internal appeals process focuses on notions of responsible and democratic self-government. As noted when discussing
whether employee and judicial interests would be served by requiring intra-union exhaustion, however, responsible union self-government is not likely to emerge; more likely are instances of bias and
disingenuous union conduct.8 8 Perhaps discussion of union interests could end with the conclusion that such interest is not in fact
served by the exhaustion requirement; there remain, however, the
arguments that union members are statutorily required by the
LMRDA, and contractually obligated by their union constitutions,
Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 800-01 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1972); Petersen v. Rath
Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Apartment, Motel,
Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1027 n.16 (9th Cir. 1972).
Contra, Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 568-69 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
85
Simpson and Berwick suggest that, when an employer is not permitted to
utilize the defense of failure to exhaust intra-union remedies, plaintiff-employees
have an incentive to name only their employers as defendants, thereby undermining
the federal policy enunciated in Vaca. Simpson & Berwick, supra note 10, at 1224.
However, whenever the plaintiff's action relies upon an alleged breach of the
union's duty of fair representation, the union would seem to be an indispensable
party under rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Crv. P. 19.
Accordingly, the union would have to be joined and federal policy could not be
undermined. Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206, 210 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). Contra, Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1978);
Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); but see Kaiser v.
Local 83, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1978) (court stated
neither union nor employer an indispensable party; suit continued against union
after summary judgment for employer); but cf. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25,
29 (1970) (damages caused by employer's violation of contract and by union's
failure to represent fairly are separate issues).
80558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
87Id. 1279. See also Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145, 149 (7th
Cir. 1978); Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206, 210 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
88
See text accompanying notes 57 & 61-68 supra.
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to exhaust internal union appeals. Although courts may seem to
have abdicated judicial responsibility by failing to explore the adequacy of union remedies and the likelihood of impartial union
review even when applying the "futility" exception, 9 perhaps the
absence of analysis stems from a subtler judgment that Congress
and union governing bodies have made findings they must respect.
This possibility necessitates a closer examination of the contract
and statutory theories.
At the outset, it should be noted that the title I exhaustion
proviso states only that a "member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures" within his union.9 0 Similarly, only
members of unions can be said to be contractually obligated to
comply with exhaustion requirements in their union constitutions.
Where does this leave the non-member employee? Does the intraunion exhaustion doctrine not apply to section 301 actions brought
by non-members? Clearly, when processing grievances, unions owe
a duty of fair representation to all employees in their bargaining
units, members and non-members alike. Inevitably, non-members
as well as members will initiate section 301 actions alleging a breach
of this duty. By refusing to join, or by resigning from the union,
can workers eliminate this significant hurdle to prosecution of their
breach of contract suits against their employers?
Very possibly, yes. Indeed, in Soto Segarrav. Sea-Land Service,
Inc.,91 the first case in which the issue has arisen, the First Circuit
squarely held that "[s]ince appellee was not a union member, he
was not bound by contract with the union to exhaust any formal
internal union appeals before resorting to a judicial forum." 92
Similarly, because the title I exhaustion proviso also applies only to
union members, it cannot supply a legitimate foundation for the
exhaustion doctrine in section 301 suits.
Few courts have recognized this disparity in treatment of members and non-members, much less attempted to reconcile it with
their imposition of intra-union exhaustion as one of the prerequisites to section 301 litigation. This disparity in treatment,
however, substantially erodes the theoretical and legal foundation
See note 67 supra.
4
0OLMRDA § 101(a)( ),29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4)
89

(1976) (emphasis added).
91581 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1978).
92 Id. 295. Cf. Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 102 L.R.R.M. 2219, 2220-21 & n.3
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.3436 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980) (no comment
on district court's reliance on member/non-member distinction); Neal v. System
Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965) (distinguishing cases
involving non-members and stating non-members "had no internal union procedures available to them") (under the Railway Labor Act).
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for application of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine to section 301
litigation. To the extent that only union members may be saddled
with the intra-union exhaustion requirement in addition to the
grievance exhaustion requirement, the courts may be creating an
incentive for workers to refuse to join, or to resign from, unions in
order to have access to the courts when necessary to obtain workplace justice. Although some might acclaim this result, it may
hardly be said to have been intended, and it certainly does not
promote union interests.
Any contractual justification for the intra-union exhaustion
requirement can certainly be criticized, therefore, because of its
disparate impact on union members and non-members. The contract theory is, however, more fundamentally flawed. Indeed, respected scholars have challenged the argument that even members
are contractually bound to exhaust intra-union remedies. 93 Many
employees are only "nominal" members, having joined the union
because membership was a condition of employment under a unionsecurity clause in their contract. Even those employees who voluntarily seek full-fledged membership status are presented with a fully
elaborated union constitution. The provisions of the constitution
are not negotiated by the "parties"; in this sense, the union constitution is simply a contract of adhesion. The unfairness is greatest
in the many instances in which courts have been willing to impose
upon union members constructive knowledge of the union's constitutional appeals procedures. 94 Unions are not required to supply
members, whether "nominal" or full-fledged, with copies of their
93

Although noting some departures from such uncritical application, Professor
Clyde Summers has observed:
The most deeply embedded doctrine in the law of internal union
affairs is that the union constitution is a contract which defines the rights
and duties between a member and his union. The courts, seduced by
its deceptive simplicity, have ignored its logical difficulties and have
verbalized their decisions in rigid Willistonian terms. Their only function,
they constantly reiterate, is to read the constitution and apply it.
Summers, Union Democracy and Union Discipline, NEw YoRK UNmvEsrrY FiFTH
AmuAr. CONFENCE oN LABor 443, 461 (1952).
In most states in which union-security clauses in labor agreements are not
prohibited by "right-to-work" statutes, it may be necessary for employees to join
the union, or at least to pay dues as nominal members, in order to retain their
employment. The question has been raised whether, under these circumstances, the
employee has voluntarily agreed to be bound by the union constitution which may
be more accurately described as a contract of adhesion. Simpson & Berwick,
supra note 10, at 1221. Indeed, union-security provisions can only require
employees to become "nominal" members through the payment of dues, not to
become "full-fledged" members by taking an oath subscribing to the union constitution. Local 680, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 980 (9th
Cir. 1979). See also Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 272 n.44 (D. Minn.
1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
94 See cases cited in note 80 supra.
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constitutions, the source of information about both the exhaustion

requirement and the appeals procedures. 95 These difficulties seriously undermine any reliance on a contract theory to support the
intra-union exhaustion doctrine.
A careful reevaluation of the applicability of the title I exhaustion proviso to section 301 suits is also necessary. Commentators have universally agreed that section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,
containing the proviso, is "perhaps the most ambiguous of all
[provisions] in the Act" and one which the legislative history does
little to illuminate. 96 What is clear is that the subsection was not
intended to restrict, but rather to assure, the member's right to sue
his union. 97 As a basis for the section 301 exhaustion doctrine,
however, the proviso seems to have been used to accomplish the
opposite result.
The actual language of section 101(a)(4) 98 is very broad; it
would seem to apply to any action, including a section 301 suit,
regardless whether the action seeks to enforce the member's civil or
political rights afforded by the title I "Bill of Rights of Union
Members." 99 If the exhaustion proviso had been intended by
Congress to be applied whenever a member might sue his union,
95LMRDA §201(a), 29 U.S.C. §431(a) (1976), requires unions only to
adopt constitutions and bylaws and to file copies with the Department of Labor.
There is no obligation to supply members with copies of these governing instruments. Indeed, it can sometimes be difficult for members to obtain copies. See
Farmer v. Hotel Workers Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2185 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
Compare LMRDA § 104, 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1976), requiring unions to provide
employees with copies of their collective bargaining agreements.
96
Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members Under Title I & Section 610
of the Landrum-Griflith Act, 52 Gio. LJ. 339, 350 (1964); see O'Donoghue,
Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue Under the Landrum-Grifith Act, 14
CATv. U. L. REv. 215, 223-34 (1965); see also NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 427 (1968).
97
The basic intent and purpose of the provision was to insure the right
of a union member to resort to the courts, administrative agencies, and
legislatures without interference or frustration of that right by a labor
organization. On the other hand, it was not, and is not, the purpose of
the law . . . to invalidate the considerable body of State and Federal

court decisions of many years [sic] standing which require, or do not
require, the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention
depending upon the reasonableness of such requirements in terms of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case. So long as the union
member is not prevented by his union from resorting to the courts, the
intent and purpose of the "right to sue" provision is fulfilled ....
105 CoNc. REc. 17899 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). See Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 78 n.2 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
98 See note 81 supra.
99 See Operating Eng'rs Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions

Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcr. L. REv. 819, 839-41 (1960)
(acknowledging ambiguity but advocating broad view of § 101(a) (4)).
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then intra-union exhaustion would be appropriate not only in
section 301 suits alleging a breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation, but also in suits under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 100 alleging racial discrimination by unions and in
actions under the National Labor Relations Act charging unions
with unfair labor practices. 10 1 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,10 2

however, the Supreme Court left little doubt that section

101(a)(4) may not be invoked to require intra-union exhaustion
before initiating title VII suits;

103

in NLRB v. Industrial Union of

Marine & Shipbuilding Workers,'.0 the Court noted that the title I
exhaustion proviso may not be employed to impede member access
to public tribunals unless the union's "internal affairs" are involved.10 5 In that case, a worker had been expelled from his union
for failing to exhaust internal union appeals before filing charges
with the NLRB alleging that his union had unlawfully caused his
employer to discriminate against him.'"° Although no charges were
filed against the employer, the Court stated:
The employer might also have been made a party and
comprehensive and coordinated remedies provided [by the
NLRB]. Those issues cannot be fully explored in an internal union proceeding. There cannot be any justification to make the public processes wait until the union
member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate
to deal with all phases of the complex problem concerning
employer, union, and employee member. If the member
becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of
10042 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
101 NLBA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
102415
03

U.S. 36, 56-60 & n.19 (1974).

In two cases predating Gardner-Denver, courts of appeals bad found
exhaustion requirements justified in suits challenging discriminatory labor practices.
1

Both cases arose under the Railway Labor Act. Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377
F.2d 243 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967); Neal v. System Bd. of
Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1965). Presumably, these cases are no longer
good law.
3o4 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
Id. 426 n.8.
106To be sure, Marine Workers involved an NLRB proceeding, rather than a
105

section 301 claim of violation of the union's duty of fair representation. It is also
true that the issue before the Court was narrow: whether the section 101(a)(4)
exhaustion proviso in the LMRDA authorizes unious to discipline a member for
failure to exhaust union remedies before filing a complaint with the NLRB. The
Court's analysis of that situation is, however, quite relevant in the section 301
setting. See text following note 107 infra for a discussion of the Court's analysis
and its relevance to § 301 litigation. But see Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d
1338, 1344 (7th Cir. 1978) ("the public policy aspects of labor disputes are of
greater importance in unfair labor practice suits before the NLRB than in Section
301(a) suits, which focus more on the vindication of private contract rights").
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public policy are never reached and an airing of the griev107
ance never had.
No less than the employee's charges in Marine Workers, a typical
section 301 action involves "a complex problem concerning the
employer, union and employee." That the employee bringing a
section 301 suit need not be a union member10 8 serves only to move
the situation even farther from the "internal affairs" setting. This
background suggests that the section 101(a)(4) exhaustion proviso is
also inapplicable in section 301 litigation.
Although the intra-union exhaustion doctrine in the section
301 setting has, since the decision in Marine Workers, achieved a
level of acceptance approaching judicial dogma, few courts have
attempted to reconcile the doctrine with the Supreme Court's teachings in Marine Workers.10 9 In Chambers v. Local 639, International
107 391 U.S. at 425.
108 This distinction between the member-union and employee-employer relationship was actually drawn by the Third Circuit in Brady v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969), a decision
subsequently cited as authority for the extension of the intra-union exhaustion
doctrine to section 301 litigation. In Brady, the court held that exhaustion of
union remedies is appropriate only when the employee's claim concerns the
internal, member-union relationship. Id. 104. Brady's discharge by TWA had been
precipitated by the union when he refused to pay a dues increase he had disputed.
Hence, although Brady alleged that the union violated its duty of fair representation,
his claim against the union actually arose from the internal, member-union relationship and implicated title I rights and the LMRDA exhaustion provision. Indeed,
the court itself recognized the confusion of the unfair-representation and title I
claims, noting that "[tihe complaint and its amendments [were] artlessly drawn
and the prayers for relief [were], to say the least, confusing." Id. 103. Brady is
not authority for the proposition that valid unfair-representation claims automatically
involve internal union concerns.
Reliance on Brady as support for the intra-union exhaustion doctrine is also
troublesome because, contrary to the teachings of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967), the court treated Brady's contract and unfair-representation claims as
separate and independent causes of action. Thus, although it dismissed Brady's
unfair-representation action against the union for failure to exhaust, it proceeded to
find that the union had improperly asked TWA to discharge him and that the
discharge was in violation of contract; the court then awarded against TWA the
relief requested. Most § 301 courts have, in contrast, followed Vaca and held
that the employee's contract claim cannot be considered until a breach of fair
representation by the union has been found. These courts have then relied on
the intra-union exhaustion doctrine to dismiss the employees suit against the
employer as well as against the union, a decidedly harsher result than that in
Brady. E.g., Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Pawlak v. Teamsters Local 764, 444 F. Supp. 807, 811-12 (M.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978); McFadden v. Ford Motor Co., 89 L.R.R.M.
2398, 2400 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Ward v. Local 45, UAW, 87 L.R.R.M. 2813, 2815
(N.D. Ohio 1972). But see note 85 supra.
109 But see Derr v. Bright, 297 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Harrison
v. Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 623-24, 174 N.W.2d 875, 891-92
(1969) (concurring and dissenting opinion). After these two opinions in 1969,
Marine Workers lay dormant until 1978 when it was resurrected by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Brotherhood of Teamsters," ° however, the District of Columbia
Circuit recently recognized the significance of Marine Workers and
relied upon it to find improper the requirement that intra-union
procedures be exhausted before initiating a section 301 action which
it characterized as focusing "on the employment relation rather
than the union relation, though the alleged improper activity by
the union may be an integral part and contributing cause of the
damages suffered by [plaintiffs]." 1I Examining the plaintiffs' requested relief, the court found that it would be "repugnant to
fundamental requirements of fairness" to require exhaustion of
internal union procedures which were plainly inadequate to remedy
employer violations. 1 2
Although union conduct is an issue in most section 301 actions,
the focus typically has not been upon purely internal union political
or constitutional matters, but rather upon the union's breach of its
duty of fair representation, an issue which raises no less a statutory
question than whether title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or
the LMRDA has been violated. Alleged union violations of statutory duties automatically raise questions involving public, rather
than internal union policies. The duty of fair representation is,
after all, a statutory obligation owed by the union to all employees
regardless of their union status.
The cases construing section 101(a)(4), particularly Marine
Workers and Chambers,assuredly suggest that before the exhaustion
proviso of title I may properly be invoked by the courts, at least in
the section 301 context, the "internal affairs" test must be met.
Although some may still wonder if such a test is valid in light of
the exceedingly broad language of the proviso, a brief review of the
LMRDA should allay any such concerns. Recall that the LMRDA
was intended to make unions democratic institutions."13 Title I,
also known as the union members' "Bill of Rights," guarantees the
political or civil rights of union members to speak and assemble
freely; .14 to attend union meetings and to participate and vote in
1o578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
111Id. 386-87 (emphasis in original).
112 Id. 387-88. See Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Derr v. Bright, 297 F. Supp. 12 (M.D.
Pa. 1969). But see NLBB v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473, 476
(5th Cir. 1978) (discipline of union steward for filing NLRB charges against
company "is no less 'internal' because the policy sought to be enforced is embodied

in collective bargaining agreement rather than in a union's constitution or by-laws").
:LI See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872, 883 (10th
Cir. 1965).
114LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
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elections and deliberations on union business,"1 5 including the approval of dues and assessments; Ill to receive certain due-process
protections during union disciplinary hearings; 11 and, of course, to
institute legal actions against their unions subject to the exhaustion
proviso." 8 Title I claims inevitably involve the member-union
relationship-plainly an internal matter.
The LMRDA's other titles have either separate exhaustion
provisions or none at all, perhaps suggesting that the title I exhaustion proviso was intended to apply only to suits by members against
their unions to secure their title I membership rights."19 For example, title II authorizes members to sue to require that their
unions make available for inspection their financial records, 20 with
the only apparent condition being demonstration of "just cause." 121
In title III suits to lift trusteeships, 122 the courts have specifically
12 3
found the section 101(a)(4) exhaustion proviso inapplicable.
Under title IV, members are denied the right to sue their unions
directly to set aside undemocratic elections; rather, they may only
request the Secretary of Labor to sue on their behalf after they have
24
exhausted intra-union remedies for a maximum of three months
The titles I and IV exhaustion requirements not only involve time
limits which differ in length by a month, but exhaustion is mandatory under title IV yet permissive under title I.1 5 Finally, title V
authorizes members to sue their union officers for breach of fiduciary
duty if, after having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to act
on a request by the member, the union fails to initiate proceedings
"5LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(1)
16LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(3)
1-LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(5)
318LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4)
19 See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343
1965).
120LMRDA §201(c), 29 U.S.C. §431(c)

(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
F.2d 872, 881 (10th Cir.

(1976).
See Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738, 744
(9th Cir. 1967) (just-cause standard "minimal," requiring only that member have
reasonable basis for requesting inspection).
122 LMRDA § 304, 29 U.S.C. § 464 (1976).
123 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872, 881 (10th
Cir. 1965) ("[slection 101(a)(4) is applicable only where individual violations
of the so-called Bill of Rights provisions are alleged and does not apply where, as
here, the validity of a trusteeship is being challenged"). But cf. Local 13410,
UMW v. UMW, 475 F.2d 906, 910 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (failure to exhaust does
not preclude judicial intervention when exhaustion "futile").
124 LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1976).
125 Compare § 402 with § 101(a) (4), as construed by the Supreme Court in
Marine Workers, 391 U.S. at 426 (under § 101(a) (4), "public tribunals whose aid
is invoked may in their discretion stay their hands for four months, while the
aggrieved person seeks relief within the union").
121
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or to take other appropriate action.U6 A sweeping, all-inclusive
reading of the title I exhaustion proviso is difficult to reconcile
with these other, clearly distinct provisions in the LMRDA.
A comprehensive reading of the LMRDA thus discloses that
Congress explicitly created a number of separate and distinct prerequisites to suit in each of the several titles. If the title I exhaustion proviso cannot be said to apply even to other LMRDA suits
by members against their unions when those suits do not directly
involve their title I political or civil membership-rights, it becomes
difficult to argue that the proviso was intended nonetheless to extend to virtually all legal proceedings initiated by members, including section 801 suits. Yet, this is in fact what courts in section 301
cases have assumed.
To the extent that the duty of fair representation has a parallel
in the LMRDA, it more closely resembles the fiduciary duty owed
by union officers to their members under title V 17 than any duty
created by title 1.125 Yet, as we have seen, a member is required
by section 501 only to have requested without success that his union
seek appropriate relief, before bringing his own suit against the
officer for breach of a title V fiduciary duty. In short, the member
need not exhaust any particular intra-union procedures before suing
under section 501. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that
the union may not only wish, but may also be able, to pursue an
officer's breach of his section 501 fiduciary duty to the membership
and to recover misappropriated funds from the officer and other
relief necessary to protect itself as an institution. In contrast, the
union has no comparable incentive to remedy a breach of its duty
of fair representation by providing injured members with a monetary award from its own treasury. 29 Hence, even the section 501
exhaustion requirement is an inappropriate prerequisite to bringing
a section 301 suit.
.128LMRDA §501(b), 29 U.S.C. §501(b) (1976).
See Purcell v. Keane,
406 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding, after careful analysis, that "[it is quite
evident that the intent of Congress was to adopt a separate procedure under 501(b)

free from the exhaustion restriction set forth in 411(a)(4)"). But cf. Coleman v.
Brotherhood of By. & Steamship Clerks, 228 F. Supp. 276, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965) (when not futile, failure to exhaust grounds
for dismissal).
127 LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
128 See Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 of the
LMRDA, 52 Minx. L. REv. 437, 478-81 (1967); see also Brady v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
129 See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra. Moreover, it would be futile to
ask a union to overturn a grievance settlement or arbitral award defined by the
contract to be final and binding on the parties. See, e.g., Miller v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2591, 2593 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980). This obstacle does not
arise in the section 501 context.
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In light of this comparison of the duty-of-fair-representation
requirements with those under the somewhat similar fiduciary duty
of title V, the contrast with title I now seems even sharper. Application of the title I exhaustion proviso in cases involving title I
membership rights is of course entirely appropriate; not only does
it avoid undue judicial interference with a union's purely internal,
political affairs, it also encourages the development of responsible,
democratic governing processes. Extension of the exhaustion requirement to section 801 actions, on the other hand, not only does
not promote responsible union conduct, it may well inspire disingenuous union action aimed at depriving employees of their
statutory right to fair representation. 8 0 From a policy, as well as a
legal, point of view, extension of the title I exhaustion proviso to
section 301 actions is indefensible.
Thus, the "internal affairs" test suggested by the Marine
Workers opinion seems a valid way of narrowing the applicability
of the loosely worded title I exhaustion proviso. The duty-of-fairrepresentation issue raised in section 301 litigation extends beyond
a union's purely internal affairs into the public arena. Indeed, the
duty of fair representation is owed to all employees represented by
unions, members and non-members alike, while the language of the
title I proviso purports to require only "members" to exhaust internal union procedures before suing their unions. Similarly, only
full-fledged members who have voluntarily joined their unions may
even arguably be said to be bound contractually to honor constitutional exhaustion requirements. Neither the statutory nor the contract theories invoked by the courts in fact support their extension
of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine to section 301 actions initiated by employees. Thus, we discover that, in addition to failing to
promote the interest of employees seeking vindication of their collective bargaining rights or the interests of courts in simplifying
issues or avoiding litigation entirely, the intra-union exhaustion
doctrine as currently applied by most courts serves no legitimate
employer or union interests.
30

See text accompanying notes 57 & 61-68 supra. Additional problems, beyond the distortions of facts and issues in written opinions designed to avoid liability,
may arise when the intra-union procedures include consideration of the claim by
1

the membership and/or convention delegates.

Unpopular employees, dissidents, and

minority groups may soon discover that their very clear contract rights are being

sacrificed in the name of majority rule.

When statutory issues are involved, re-

quiring exhaustion of democratic procedures within private institutions invites discrimination in violation of laws and public policies. See Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper
Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970) (doubt about fairness of vote by "predominantly male union membership" on discrimination claim by women employees);
General Truck Drivers, 217 N.L.R.B. 616 (1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1976).
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II. THE RARE CASE IN WHICH APPLICATION OF THE INTRA-UNION
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE MAY BE

JUSTIFIED

A. The Proper Perspective
A strong argument can be made that intra-union exhaustion
has no place in any unfair-representation case, whether or not associated with a section 301 contract claim. To be sure, the typical
unfair-representation claim is filed by a member against his union,
but fair representation is not a right of union membership. Rather,
it is a statutory duty owed by the union to all employees in the
bargaining unit by virtue of their employment relationship. Employees in the bargaining unit who are not at the same time union
members can still sue for injuries resulting from unfair union
representation. 131 If union membership is thus irrelevant, why
should it enter the calculus when the aggrieved employee is by
chance a union member? After all, the employee is still seeking
only to vindicate rights conferred by federal statute. When courts
in section 301 cases speak of "forestall[ing] judicial interference with
the internal affairs of a labor organization" to allow it to "resolve
disputes concerning its own legitimate affairs," 1.32 they misconstrue
1
the basic character of the duty-of-fair-representation complaint.
Fair representation in any form is simply not an internal union
membership dispute arising under the union constitution. 134
When a claim of unfair representation is joined with a breachof-contract claim against the employer-as is typical in section 301
litigation-the argument for abolishing the exhaustion doctrine altogether is strengthened considerably. As we have seen, the two
claims, though distinct in theory, are inextricably linked in prac131Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (under Railway
Labor Act).
132Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 104 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) (emphasis added) (under Railway Labor Act).
133 Professor David Feller has labelled the intra-union exhaustion requirement
in section 301 cases "plainly erroneous." He has observed:
It imposes a bar based on a right arising out of union membership to a
suit in which membership is irrelevant and which is based solely on
employee status and section 9 [of the NLRAI. If the employee has filed
a grievance . .. and the union official charged with the responsibility of
processing his claim refuses to proceed, the employee should not be required to appeal through the union hierarchy before filing suit.
Feller, supra note 1, at 813-14 (footnotes omitted).
34 The distinction can be further illustrated by analogizing to another situation
in which a member's statutory rights would clearly conflict with his obligations to
exhaust remedies under his union constitution. Suppose a member rents an apartment in a union-owned building and discovers that it is infested with rats and
contains fire hazards. Should the member be required to exhaust all internal union
appeals before reporting the violations of health and fire codes?
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tice.135 Much that is involved in the claim of unfair representation

turns on the outcome of the underlying contract claim, while the
contract claim requires an initial proof of unfair representation.
Indeed, in Vaca v. Sipes the Supreme Court acknowledged "the
intricate relationship between the duty of fair representation and
the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts." 136 To call fair
representation in the section 301 context an internal union dispute
is therefore doubly wrong: neither the fair-representation nor the
contract issue involves "internal" union-member concerns. Two
inseparable claims are involved, and even if the union were competent to handle one-which it is not-it would be simpler and more
desirable to deal with both claims simultaneously in a single
proceeding.
As we have seen, the District of Columbia Circuit recently
relied upon the "internal affairs" test of NLRB v. Industrial Union
of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers 137 in finding that it would be
improper to require exhaustion of intra-union procedures before
initiating a section 301 action-an action which "focuses on the
employment relation rather than the union relation, though the
alleged improper activity by the union may be an integral part and
contributing cause of the damages suffered by [plaintiffs]." 138 The
court's carefully reasoned decision may well signal that the judiciary
is ready to look more skeptically at the use of intra-union exhaustion
in section 301 actions. Particularly because the doctrine has grown
largely by accretion, with almost no serious consideration having
been given to its actual effects, such skepticism is long overdue.
B. Reactivation of Grievance Procedures
To this point our argument has proceeded on a critical, albeit
entirely reasonable, assumption-that the contract statute of limitations has run and intra-union appeals can no longer reactivate the
employee's contract grievance. 39 However, in the highly unusual
situation in which the grievance can be reactivated and the grievant
assured of fair representation in the resumed proceeding, so that
the grievance may yet be resolved pursuant to the contract grievance
machinery, our conclusion that intra-union appeals can provide no
135 See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
136386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967).
137391 U.S. 418, 426 n.8 (1968).
138 Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C.

Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original). See text accompanying notes 110-112 supra.
139 See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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meaningful relief must be qualified. 140 The critical difference is a
matter of available remedies. Although union tribunals certainly
cannot require employers to reinstate terminated employees, pay
back wages, restore seniority, and the like, arbitrators can. Under
these circumstances, the imposition of an intra-union exhaustion
requirement may be appropriate, though other circumstances may

counsel against even this limited application. 141
Moreover, when an intra-union appeal can precipitate arbitration of the employee's contract claim, it serves not only the employee's interest in obtaining resolution of his claim, but also the
federal policy encouraging the settlement of labor disputes by
arbitrators-that is, by those presumed to be expert in the law of
the shop. 142 Under these narrow circumstances, there may be sound
reasons of policy to justify the application of an intra-union exhaustion doctrine-though not for the reasons customarily offered by
the courts.4s
As reformulated, the intra-union exhaustion doctrine would be
confined to just those cases in which (1)union tribunals are constitutionally authorized to reactivate grievances, (2) the union can be
expected to provide full and fair representation once the grievance
is reinstated, and (3) the collective bargaining agreement explicitly
allows grievances to be reactivated by union tribunals. 44 Were the
doctrine so confined, the parties to collective bargaining would have
an incentive to develop meaningful procedures qualifying for
temporary judicial deference. To the extent that such new procedures actually enable aggrieved employees to obtain prompt and
fair grievance hearings and ultimate disposition of their contract
claims, federal policy and the interests of all the parties would be
served; indeed, it is possible that much section 301 litigation could
be avoided. The mere possibility of reactivation is not enough; the
140 The relief afforded by the union tribunal does not, of course, remedy the
alleged contract violation. That relief generally can be secured only pursuant to
contract grievance-arbitration procedures.
141 For discussion of these difficulties, see text accompanying notes 147-171
infra.

142 See Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 296 (lst Cir.
1978); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972); Miller

v. Local 50, Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers, 468 F. Supp. 193, 198 (D. Neb. 1979).
'43 See

text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.

Of course, whenever a union has already entered into a "final settlement"
of the grievance, the union is contractually prohibited from repudiating that settlement by seeking to reactivate the underlying grievance. See, e.g., Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2591, 2593 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980); Buchholtz v.
Swift & Co., 102 L.R.R.M. 2219, 2221 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3436 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980). Decisions by all Teamster bipartite labor-management
grievance committees, for example, are contractually defined as final and binding
144

awards.

But see Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1978).
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procedures should yield positive results. If they fail to reactivate
grievances and to restore fair representation after a reasonable trial
period, the courts should treat them no differently from conventional intra-union appeals. 45
C. Procedural Guidelinesfor Application of the
Intra-UnionExhaustion Doctrine
Even when, because of unusual circumstances, an intra-unionexhaustion requirement may be appropriate, the courts should impose procedural safeguards to ensure that employees' rights are not
prejudiced. First, the courts must develop a clear definition of
what constitutes exhaustion. Second, the burden of demonstrating
that the exhaustion doctrine is appropriate under the circumstances
should be imposed upon the party urging exhaustion. Finally,
unions should be required to provide such information and other
assistance as are necessary to enable members effectively to pursue
intra-union appeals.
1. The Need for a Clear Definition of Intra-Union Exhaustion
A clear picture of what an employee must do to exhaust intraunion remedies has yet to emerge from section 301 cases. Some
courts have said that a member need give his union only a "reason145 There may, however, be a situation in which intra-union exhaustion of
remedies is still appropriate. When the collective bargaining agreement actually
designates the intra-union appellate process as the mechanism for resolving contract
disputes, or when it has functioned in that manner in practice, exhaustion of the
union remedies may be the equivalent of exhaustion of contract remedies as mandated by Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
An example of this exceptional case is presented in Battle v. Clark Equip. Co.,
579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978). At issue in that case was the formula by which
employees would be entitled to "Supplemental Unemployment Benefits" (SUB),
which the employer was contractually obliged to pay following a plant shutdown.
The employer acquiesced to a union request that the formula for distribution of
SUB funds be modified from an equal amount per employee to a graduated
formula based upon seniority. The employer's liability was not affected by the
change, so it stood in the position of a disinterested stakeholder. The contract
explicitly required an internal union appeal to resolve disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the SUB plan. Intra-union exhaustion was appropriate because the disputes arose under a contract provision in an agreement in
which the union was delegated responsibility for construing the provision and had
the ability to remedy the problem. A similar situation might arise were a union
to refuse to refer members to jobs under an "exclusive hiring hall" arrangement
which it independently administered. See Davis v. Local 242, Laborers, 84
L.R.R.M. 2544 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
Such agreements are relatively rare today and are found only in a few trades
(music, printing, construction) in which employers merely subscribe to "agreements"
written by a union that represents employees who are usually needed on only a temporary basis. See generally Feller, supra note 1, at 724-36. Of course, exhaustion of
union remedies under such "trade agreements" cannot be lumped with exhaustion
of such remedies under conventional agreements.
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able opportunity" to take action on his complaint. 146 Others have
required, regardless of the time involved and the possibility that
the statute of limitations for filing suit may run out during the
process, that the employee exhaust every appeal provided by the
union constitution up to, and including, appeal to international
conventions. 147 As a result, employees have little idea how far, or
how long, they must pursue union appeals. Unions, on the other
hand, have an incentive to multiply the number of appeals that a
member must pursue and to procrastinate in processing those appeals in the hope of exhausting the member and frustrating his
pursuit of legal remedies in the courts.
This unsatisfactory situation demands judicial clarification.
The better approach would be to structure exhaustion requirements
in terms of elapsed time rather than in terms of available procedures
which vary widely from union to union, imposing small burdens
on some section 301 plaintiffs and great burdens on others. Moreover, a requirement of limited duration would prevent the troublesome proliferation of appeals and force unions to deal with duty-ofA
fair-representation complaints expeditiously or not at all.
148
seems
proviso,
exhaustion
four-month limit, as in the LMRDA
appropriate when exhaustion is required under section 301. Under
the proviso, union members are presumed to have exhausted their
union appeals four months after seeking relief from their unions.
Congress's conclusion that four months offers sufficient opportunity for unions to remedy violations of their members' title I
civil rights provides some evidence that unions cannot reasonably
require a longer period to remedy violations of their members' right
to fair representation. To require more risks exhausting the member rather than the remedies. Moreover, by adopting the title I
time limit, the intra-union exhaustion doctrine would at least be
made more uniform.
2. Demonstration of Propriety of Application of Doctrine
Because exhaustion of intra-union remedies rarely serves any
useful purpose in section 301 litigation, the courts should presume
that exhaustion of such remedies is futile.149 A party wishing to
146 E.g., Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977).
'47 E.g., Foley v. Chrysler Corp., 78 L.R.R.M. 2744 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
See
text accompanying notes 34-47 supra.
148 See note 81 supra.
149 "Cumbersome, ineffective, time-consuming and inherently biased union

appeals procedures should be deemed futile as a matter of law." Tobias, Individual
Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair
Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514, 532 (1974). See note 67 supra.
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attack the presumption should have the burden of pleading and
proving (1) that the particular internal union appeals procedure
has actually operated, or can reasonably be expected to operate, to
resolve fair-representation issues quickly and fairly, to reactivate
withdrawn or abandoned grievances, and to restore fair representation, and (2) that the contract permits the grievance to be reactivated by a union tribunal without prejudice to the grievant. 150
The burden of establishing that intra-union exhaustion is appropriate in a given situation may quite reasonably be placed upon
the parties who not only profit from its application but also possess
virtually all the relevant information. Only the union can supply
concrete information about the purpose, structure, and actual operation of its appeals process. As a co-defendant, the employer should
have little difficulty obtaining this information from the union.
The individual employee, however, is generally unfamiliar with
the intra-union appeals process 151 and normally would have to rely
on discovery to acquire such information. To impose upon the
employee the burden of proving that intra-union appeals would be
futile is to impose an unjust handicap which will, in most cases,
prove fatal to his suit. 5 2
The procedural rules currently governing intra-union exhaustion in section 301 litigation are chaotic. As a result, section 301
plaintiffs have little idea of what is necessary to preserve their cause
of action, and are often caught totally off guard. Courts have held
that intra-union exhaustion is a "prerequisite" to suit under section
301; what is meant by use of the term is not clear. Some of these
courts have suggested that intra-union exhaustion is a "jurisdictional
prerequisite" to a section 301 suit, with dismissal presumably appropriate under rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 153 Most courts have, however, qualified the term, finding
150 Employees should not be required to pursue intra-union remedies even for
four months if the contract statute of limitations runs for a shorter period or has
already expired.
151 See text accompanying notes 165-66 infra.
152 See notes 44-47 supra.
'-3 E.g., Csanadi v. Teamsters Local 773, 463 F. Supp. 276, 282 (E.D. Pa.
1978) ("Csanadi's failure to exhaust his internal union remedies or, in the alternative, his failure to present an adequate reason to avoid the exhaustion requirement,
deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear his complaint of unfair representation
.... "); Pullen v. General Motors Corp., 444 F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D. Mo. 1978);
Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 364 F. Supp. 302, 309 n.10 (D. Del. 1973)
(dismissal for failure to exhaust union remedies though such remedies time-barred
when suit dismissed); Foley v. Chrysler Corp., 78 L.R.R.M. 2744 (S.D. Ind.
1971); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
But see Dorn v. Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 782 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(complaint failing to allege intra-union exhaustion not to be dismissed under FED.
R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6)).
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exhaustion to be a prerequisite only when remedies are available
within the union. 54 The effect of this qualification is to shift the
burden of pleading to the defendant, requiring him to allege as an
affirmative defense the existence of some intra-union appellate
process which the plaintiff has not pursued. Typically, this burden
is met by a union's motion for summary judgment supported by an
affidavit from a union official. The employee is then expected to
make a "clear and positive showing of futility" 155 supported by
solid evidence, not conclusory allegation, in his responsive pleading.
Under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this response
may be due within ten days. 56 The employee must generally respond without benefit of discovery. Under these circumstances, it
is no wonder that many section 301 plaintiffs succumb to motions
for summary judgment.
Finally, a few courts have placed upon the party urging exhaustion as a defense the burden not only of raising the plaintiffs
failure to exhaust, but also of demonstrating that the internal union
appeals procedure "so certainly holds out the prospect of

.

.

.relief

that the plaintiffs could justifiably be expected to have recourse to
it before filing suit." 157 Because unions cannot remedy employer
contract violations or reactivate dead grievances, and because only
the union can enlighten the court regarding its own appeals procedures, this course is dearly the only acceptable one.
The positive effect of shifting the burden of proof from the
employee-plaintiff to the union- or employer-defendant can be
readily demonstrated. In Yeager v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 158 for
example, the court held that the Teamsters Union was obligated to
show that its internal appeals procedures were "reasonably calcu154 E.g., Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 1974);

Neal v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965) (under
Railway Labor Act); Gainey v. Brotherhood Ry. Steamship Clerks, 275 F.2d 342,
345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 911 (1960) (under Railway Labor Act).
155 Ime v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1974).
156 See, e.g., Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852, 856 (6th Cir. 1978);

Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243, 246-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
848 (1967) (under Railway Labor Act); White v. Remsco Management, Inc., 91
L.R.R.M. 2647, 2650 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385
F. Supp. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd, 517 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 937 (1975); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 566 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
157Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972)
(describing employer's burden of proof). See also Frederickson v. System Fed n
114, 436 F.2d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1970) (under Railway Labor Act); Patterson
v. Bailystoker & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3115, 3116 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Dorn v. Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 785-86 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
158343 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and 355 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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lated to redress the particulargrievance complained of." 159 Then,
in an unusual step, the court ordered the union to provide specific
facts in response to judicial interrogatories designed to test the
union's assertion that the internal remedy was real and not illusory.
After reviewing the union's response, the court held that the procedures set out in article XIX of the Teamster constitution "do not
provide a reasonable method whereby [plaintiff] could seek relief
from the union's failure to take his grievance to arbitration." 160
Curiously, although several courts have relied upon precedents
holding that particular union appeals procedures can afford relief
for individual employees and hence must be exhausted, 61 no court
has relied upon Yeager to deny a motion to dismiss in the many
Teamster cases in which application of the intra-union exhaustion
doctrine has been urged. 16 2 Indeed, several courts have subsequently dismissed section 301 actions brought by Teamster members, merely citing article XIX of the union constitution and the
plaintiffs' failure to prove futility. 16 3 Given the scope of the court's
discovery and the depth of its analysis of article XIX in Yeager, to
require Teamster plaintiffs in each subsequent case to prove futility
is to demand that they repeatedly "reinvent the wheel." Obviously,
shifting the burden from the plaintiff-employee to the defendantunion can achieve very different results and avoid prejudice to the
plaintiff's rights. 64
159 343 F. Supp. at 929 (emphasis in original).
160 355 F. Supp. at 334.

261 See, e.g., cases cited in note 52 supra.
162The Teamsters Union has been involved in reported section 301 decisions
in which application of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine has been considered
more often than any union other than the UAW.
163Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1978); Winter v.
Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Csanadi v.
Teamsters Local 773, 463 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1978); McGovern v. Teamsters
Local 773, 447 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 558 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1978);
Pawlak v. Teamsters Local 764, 444 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 571
F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978). None of these courts analyzed § 12(c), article XIX
of the Teamster constitution which provides inter alia: "The appeals procedure
provided herein is also available to and must be followed by any member who is
aggrieved by any decision, ruling, opinion or action of the Local Union, membership,
officers or Executive Board, excluding collective bargaining matters." Constitution
and Bylaws of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, art. XIX, § 12(c)
(adopted in June 1976) (emphasis supplied). This provision seems, on its face,
to render intra-union exhaustion futile. See Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375, 384 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Miller v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 2591, 2593 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1980) (Teamster constitution provides for only criminal-type prosecutions; similar to Bricldayers and
Stonemasons constitution at issue in Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795
(7th Cir. 1972)).
164 See, e.g., Patterson v. Bailystoker & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3115
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the court denied the union's motion for summary
judgment in part because "[Hlo examples are provided where a member employed
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3.A Requirement that Unions Inform Members of Their Rights
To perpetuate any intra-union exhaustion doctrine in section
301 proceedings, the courts should at least be willing to abandon
the axiom that ignorance of union procedures is no excuse for a
member's failure to pursue or exhaust those procedures. It is one
thing to require employees to exhaust contract grievance procedures,
but another entirely to require them to exhaust intra-union appeals.
On the one hand, unions are required to provide employees with
copies of their contracts 16 which, of course, set out the grievance
procedure. Because unions have a duty to represent fairly all employees who may have grievances, even employees unfamiliar with
the contract grievance procedures should be able to exhaust those
procedures with the assistance of their union representatives. On
the other hand, unions are not required to supply even their members with copies of their constitutions, which contain information
about both the exhaustion requirement and the appeals procedures.0 6 Moreover, when the union ceases to be the employee's
advocate in a grievance proceeding, and suddenly becomes his adversary in a potential intra-union disciplinary proceeding, one may
safely assume that it will do little to inform the employee about,
much less to assist him in exhausting, intra-union remedies. Most
union constitutions also prohibit outside legal counsel from representing members in intra-union proceedings. Under these circumstances, it is absurd to think that a union member will, by himself,
be able to pursue quasi-judicial union procedures or effectively to
advocate a union breach of its statutory duty of fair representation.
Accordingly, if the courts accept the intra-union exhaustion
doctrine under any circumstances, they should impose upon unions
a duty to inform the member specifically of his intra-union remedies
at the time that his grievance is withdrawn. The member should
also be informed that the union tribunal is empowered to reactivate
his grievance before the contract statute of limitations expires.
Finally, if the exhaustion process is to be a meaningful one, the
union should be required either to provide the member with an
unbiased representative or to permit him to retain his own counsel.
Of course, the union would then have to prove that the member
an intra-union appeal procedure to redress a failure by the union to duly represent
him." Id. 3116. According to David Klein, Counsel to the UAW's public review
board, not even the UAW can claim that more than one member has secured intraunion relief, though more than one-third of all appeals heard by the board involve
the processing of grievances. Klein, supra note 6, at 103.
165 See LMRDA § 104, 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1976).
166 LMRDA §201(a), 29 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976). See note 95 supra.
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was aware of each of these items, and the court would have to be
willing to invest considerable time addressing these ancillary issues,
before a member could be penalized in any manner for failing to
exhaust intra-union remedies.
III. PROBLEMS THAT LIE AHEAD

The discussion in part I demonstrated the undesirability of
applying the requirement of intra-union exhaustion to any section
301 litigation. Although part II uncovered an exceptional situation
in which the requirement might be justified, problems would undoubtedly arise in applying the exhaustion doctrine even in these
narrow circumstances. The ability of employees to obtain full relief
after their grievances have been reactivated by union tribunals is
somewhat doubtful. Arguably, by ordering a member's grievance
reactivated, a union tribunal has implicitly found that a breach of
the duty of fair representation occurred. The employer could then
argue that it should not be liable to the extent that the union's
initial failure to prosecute the grievance "enhanced or contributed
to the employee's injury." 16'7 Although arbitrators generally possess
the authority to determine contract claims and to award damages
against employers, they are usually not authorized to determine
fair-representation issues or to assess money damages against unions.
Indeed, if they were so authorized, union tribunals would hesitate
to invite damage awards by reactivating grievances unless they considered the union's potential liability to be negligible.
We are left with the question whether an employee who succeeds in having his grievance reactivated and ultimately wins a
favorable award will be able to obtain complete relief. Manica v.
Chrysler Corp.168 affords some insight into the question.

The col-

lective bargaining agreement between the UAW and Chrysler permitted the union to reactivate withdrawn grievances within a threemonth period but explicitly absolved Chrysler of financial liability
accruing from the time the grievance was dropped until it was later
reactivated. Even if the employee's grievance were eventually sustained, the employee would still be unable to recover full back pay
from Chrysler. Unless the union were willing to compensate him
for the difference, the employee would still be forced to seek judicial relief to complete his remedy. 169 There is no guarantee, there167 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967).
10897 L.R.R.M. 2679 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
169 Even when the union "restores" fair representation not only by reactivating
a member's grievance, but also by properly prosecuting the grievance thereafter
(perhaps by assigning a representative to assist the grievant other than the individual
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fore, that intra-union exhaustion will result in the prompt and
complete resolution of employee contract claims or the conservation
of judicial resources, even when the contract allows grievances to
be reactivated.
Similarly, imposing a four-month time limit will not resolve all
problems. One may wonder, for instance, when the four-month
period should begin: when the employee's grievance is withdrawn
or abandoned by his union; when the employee receives notice that
his grievance has been dropped; when the employee initiates his
union appeal?1 70 Consider, for example, an employee who has
failed to pursue his union appeal for a year or more after his grievance was withdrawn because he was unaware of his union's appeals
procedures until the lawyer he retained to bring a section 301 suit
informed him of the exhaustion requirement. Should the fourmonth time limit begin to run before the employee is, or should
have become, aware of an appeals procedure?
Or, suppose that a grievant is aware of his union's appeals
procedure but deliberately fails to press his appeal within four
months, or any other limitations period which might obtain, in
order to have his claim decided by a court rather than by an arbitrator. Should the court impose any penalty, either by dismissing
the claim or by sending the grievant back to the union for four
months of exhaustion? Should the court have to inquire about the
employee's intentions or the point at which he learned of his
union's procedure?
Under even the most ideal circumstances, have the problems
of bias and financial interest on the part of union tribunals been
eliminated? Would union tribunals be willing to reactivate even
the most meritorious grievance for fear of inviting an eventual court
award of damages against the union for aggravating the employee's
injuries by its delay in prosecuting his grievance?
Another continuing problem is the differing treatment of nonmembers, "nominal" members, and full-fledged union members.
Should "nominal" members who joined the union only because
membership was a condition of employment under a union-security
clause in their contract be required to exhaust union appeals? And,
is it fair to saddle union members with the exhaustion requirement
responsible for originally withdrawing or abandoning the grievance), this action
would not relieve the union of liability to the employee for injuries he may have
sustained as a result of the delay in securing his contract rights occasioned by the
union's initial refusal to prosecute his grievance.
170Cf. Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 1974)
("[n]ecessarily implied . . . is the duty to become aware of the nature and
availability of union remedies"). See also cases cited in note 80 supra.
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if it cannot be extended to non-members under any circumstances?
Suppose there is a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
possessed by, and admittedly covering, all employees, members and
non-members alike, authorizing union tribunals to reactivate grievances. Are non-union employees given notice by such a provision
sufficient to impose a duty to discover and pursue union appeals?
Suppose the contract refers to, or incorporates by reference, the
appeals provision in the union constitution. Or, suppose the contract itself elaborates the union appeals procedure available to
employees seeking to have withdrawn grievances reactivated. Would
the intra-union procedure then become a part of the contract
grievance procedure so as to require the employee either to exhaust
or to demonstrate why it would be futile to do so under Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox? 171 Of course, if this were the result, the
employee would again bear the burden of demonstrating the futility
of pursuing procedures with which he has no familiarity-procedures
which are inherently unlikely to yield any relief.
CONCLUSION

The intra-union exhaustion requirement has been imported
into section 301 litigation without any serious examination of its
appropriateness in this context. Given the unique, hybrid character of the section 301 action, and the possible applicability of
intra-union review only to a single claim, the exhaustion requirement works little more than mischief. Indeed, the policy arguments advanced to justify its uncomfortable presence in section 301
litigation prove, on close analysis, to be fanciful. The various interests said to be served by the doctrine are not in fact advanced,
and the price of these illusive benefits is substantial interference
with the ability of individual employees to vindicate their rights
under collective bargaining agreements, rights which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed.
Only in the highly unusual case in which the collective bargaining agreement allows union tribunals to reactivate grievances,
may the intra-union exhaustion doctrine be defended on the ground
that the grievance may yet be resolved pursuant to contract grievance procedures-the route favored by federal policy. Even in this
case, however, procedural safeguards for individual grievants would
have to be developed-a process which leads to a swamp of intractable problems and argues for total abandonment of the intra-union
exhaustion doctrine in cases in which employees are seeking to
171379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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vindicate statutory and contractual, as opposed to union-constitutional, rights.
The source of these problems is, once again, the fact that
section 301 litigation requires the reconciliation of a variety of
conflicting interests; according to NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, it is a "complex problem, concerning employer, union and employee member." 172 And, as the
Supreme Court said in Vaca v. Sipes: "These [section 301] remedy
problems are difficult enough when one tribunal has all parties before it; they are impossible if two independent tribunals, with
different procedures, time limitations, and remedial powers, must
participate." 173 Instead of making marginal adjustments to the
intra-union exhaustion doctrine which in turn yield a second generation of unwieldy problems, the courts may well conclude that
intra-union exhaustion has no place in section 301 litigation.
Complete abandonment of the intra-union exhaustion doctrine
in section 301 litigation would mean only that the courts would
have to resolve unfair-representation claims, just as many courts do
even when failure to exhaust is proven and cited as a reason for
dismissal. At the same time, individual employees would be given
a chance to prove unfair representation and, if successful, to vindicate their collective bargaining rights. The balance of interests
clearly favors annulment of the judicial marriage of the intra-union
exhaustion doctrine to section 301 litigation. In the words of an
astute observer of life and law: "Many a good hanging prevents a
bad marriage." 174
172

391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968).

173 386 U.S. 171, 188 n.12 (1967).
174 W. STTA=SPEAmE, TwELF m Niorr act i, sC. 5.

